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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prompt and affordable access to essential medicines is a 
component of almost all domestic and global public health 
models. As is now well known, the availability and costs of both 
brand and generic drugs are a function of traditional patent 
law incentives. Less known, however, is that generic entry is 
controlled increasingly through an emerging form of global 
intellectual property law referred to as “linkage regulations.” 
Linkage regulations tie generic drug approval and, thus, access 
to essential medications to existing drug patents through 
potentially long and costly litigation. The linkage regime is in 
the process of rapidly spreading worldwide through 
international free trade agreements. Even so, very little is 
known about how the regulations work in developed nations let 
alone how they impact public health systems across 
international borders. The authors constitute a network of 
eleven health policy experts and practicing lawyers in nine 
countries including those with mature linkage regulations, 
those with new regulations, those without regulations but with 
practices that parallel linkage, and those where regulations are 
currently subject to intense public debate and litigation. 
The study of structure-function relationships in living 
systems, both at the micro and macro levels, has served science 
especially well over the last century. The term “structure-
function” refers to the relationship between the structural and 
functional elements of a system. As demonstrated by 
pioneering work in general systems theory and systems biology 
over the last half century, the interaction between structural 
and functional elements in a given system is bi-directional; not 
only does structure influence function, but function also 
influences structure. The structure-function paradigm applies 
fundamentally to law in two ways. First, governments have 
specific legal and policy goals and these goals are expressed in 
the form of statutes and regulations. Second, these policy goals 
are reviewed by courts in judicial and are often revisited by 
governments in the context of their law reform efforts. 
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Here, we propose a novel structure-function framework to 
conduct a comparative legal analysis of global pharmaceutical 
linkage, with the aim of obtaining critical information about 
the costs and benefits of tying pharmaceutical innovation and 
generic drug availability to drug patenting. A major goal of the 
research is to investigate the structural and functional aspects 
of global linkage regulations as they relate to drug availability, 
costs, and expenditures on the one hand and incentives for 
innovation and protection of rights on the other. Nations and 
economic regions analyzed include the United States, Canada, 
Mexico, Australia, India, China, South Korea, and the 
European Union. The structural and functional aspects we 
discuss here include: assessment in each jurisdiction of the 
original policy intent underpinning linkage; the manner in 
which public health policy and economic policy are perceived by 
governments and the courts to converge or diverge through 
linkage; the specific legal checks and balances designed 
specifically to maintain balance between the interests of brand 
and generic firms; the growing expansion of linkage beyond the 
drug approval-drug patenting nexus to encompass drug pricing 
and reimbursement; and the role of empirical studies to 
establish the legal legitimacy of linkage regulations. A second 
goal of our work is to assist domestic and global governments 
and legal systems working with linkage regimes to balance the 
production of new and innovative drugs with timely generic 
entry and, thus, to lower public health costs and increase 
access to essential medicines. 
II. EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL 
LINKAGE 
Access to essential medicines is a significant component of 
most models of domestic and global public health and is central 
to the goal of ensuring value for money regarding drug costs 
and expenditures. The availability and costs of new and generic 
drugs is a function of traditional patent law incentives and 
emerging linkage regulations.1 Patent law is a well described,2 
                                                          
 1. See Ron A. Bouchard, Living Separate and Apart is Never Easy: 
Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie That Binds Obviousness and 
Inventiveness, 4 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 53–55 (2007). 
 2. See generally KENNETH ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE 
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION, reprinted in THE RATE AND 
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609–24 
(Richard Nelson ed., 1962) (explaining the economic roles of information and 
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if controversial,3 policy lever for stimulating drug 
development.4 Linkage regulations tie generic drug availability 
to existing drug patents by connecting approval to the 
resolution of patent validity or infringement.5 This can result in 
                                                          
innovation); DAVID VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL 
CONCEPTS IN LAW (2006) (providing an overview of all aspects of patent law); 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1595–1629 (2003) (outlining the ways in which patent law varies and its 
different theoretical approaches); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844–68 (1990) 
(explaining various patent law doctrines). For an account of the relationship 
between patents and drug discovery, development, and marketing from the 
earliest days of the industry to the present, see GRAHAM DUTFIELD, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 157–82 (2d ed. 2009). 
 3. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3, 11–28 
(2008); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 68–91, 149–80 (2008) [hereinafter BOLDRIN & LEVINE, 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY]; SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE 
INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 1–
3 (2003); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and 
Intellectual Property, 102 PNAS 1252, 1256 (2005); Adam Jaffe, The U.S. 
Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 
RES. POL’Y 531, 531–32 (2000); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The 
Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current 
Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 274–75 (1998); Keith Pavitt, National Policies for 
Technical Change: Where are the Increasing Returns to Economic Research?, 
93 PNAS 12,693, 12,694–95 (1996). 
 4. Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1: Impact of U.S. Supreme 
Court Patent Law on Canadian Intellectual Property and Regulatory Rights 
Landscape, 15 HEALTH L.J. 221, 239–40 (2008) [hereinafter Bouchard, KSR v. 
Teleflex Part 1]; Bouchard, supra note 1, at 23; Ron A. Bouchard, Should 
Scientific Research in the Lead-Up to Invention Vitiate Obviousness Under the 
Patented Medicines (Notice Of Compliance) Regulations: To Test or Not to 
Test?, 6 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2007); Thomas A Faunce & Joel Lexchin, 
‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in Canada and Australia, AUSTL. & 
N.Z. HEALTH POL’Y, June 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/8; Paul Jones, KSR and the 
Supreme Court: The silence is deafening, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 849, 852 (2008). 
 5. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/1993-
133 (Can.). For a review of Canadian linkage regulations, see Ron A. 
Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage 
Regulations for Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 71, 73 
(2010) [hereinafter Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby]; Edward Hore, A 
Comparison of United States and Canadian Laws as They Affect Generic 
Pharmaceutical Market Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 384–87 (2000); Joel 
Lexchin, After Compulsory Licensing: Coming Issues in Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Policy and Politics, 40 HEALTH POL’Y 69, 70–71 (1997). 
Linkage can be referred to as that between generic drug safety, quality, and 
efficacy approval to the assessment of potential patent infringement. See 
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long and costly litigation, the costs of which are ultimately 
borne by consumers.6 
The patent system has been in operation for over 500 
years, with early patent laws in Italy and the United 
Kingdom.7 By contrast, the linkage regime has only been in 
existence for about twenty-five years following passage of the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 
(Hatch-Waxman Act) in the United States in 19848 and the 
Canadian Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations (NOC Regulations).9 In both originating 
jurisdictions, the linkage regime was brought in explicitly to 
balance the competing policy goals of stimulating the 
                                                          
Thomas Faunce, Global Intellectual Property Protection for Innovative 
Pharmaceuticals: Challenges for Bioethics and Health Law, in GLOBALIZATION 
AND HEALTH: CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS 87, 91 (Belinda 
Bennett & George F. Tomossy eds., 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1409211. For the sake of 
simplicity, the term “linkage” is used in this article to refer to the nexus 
between drug approval and drug patenting. 
 6. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at 
73–82; Jean O. Lanjouw & William Jack, Trading Up: How Much Should Poor 
Countries Pay to Support Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 4 CENTER FOR GLOBAL 
DEV. BRIEF 1, 1–2 (2004). 
 7. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at 
212–242; DUTFIELD, supra note 2. 
 8. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (2000)). For a description of U.S. linkage laws, see Jeremy Bulow, The 
Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in 4 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECON. 145, 
147–51 (2004), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10802.pdf; Andrew 
A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and 
Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4–7 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, 
Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs 
Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 482–
86 (2003); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its 
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189–92 
(1999); Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 171, 174–78 (2008); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, 
Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course 
on Hatch-Waxman 1–14 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 209, 
2004). 
 9. See Christopher Scott Harrison, Protection of Pharmaceuticals as 
Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the 
North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 457, 521–25 (2001); Hore, supra note 5, at 381–87; Robert S. 
Tancer, Foreign Investment in North America and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Canada, 39 THE INT’L EXECUTIVE 283, 293 (1997). 
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development of new and innovative drugs and facilitating the 
timely entry of generic drugs.10 Compared to the patent system, 
the linkage regime therefore represents a novel and emerging 
intellectual property paradigm for protecting pharmaceutical 
inventions. Given the comparative youth of the pharmaceutical 
linkage regime, it is not surprising that empirical data is only 
now beginning to be reported on the impact of linking drug 
approval to drug patenting on the twin policy goals of 
encouraging the development of new drugs and the timely 
entry of generic competitors. This includes earlier qualitative 
studies of gaming the automatic stay and other provisions in 
the originating American and Canadian linkage regimes,11 as 
well as newer quantitative empirical studies of the performance 
and outputs of both systems over time.12 
Of growing interest from a global public health perspective, 
pharmaceutical linkage is no longer restricted to the North 
American context or solely to the drug approval-drug patenting 
nexus. Indeed, in 2011 we are witnessing the rapid spread of 
the linkage regime on a global level including to developing 
countries where access to generics is both of more significance 
and more problematic.13 This is due to a growing number of 
                                                          
 10. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 108; Avery, supra note 
8, at 175. 
 11. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at i–xi (July 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; see also Caffrey & Rotter, 
supra note 8, at 35–37. See generally Bulow, supra note 8; Epstein and Kuhlik, 
supra note 8; Avery, supra note 8. 
 12. Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug 
Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 174, 174, 192–217 (2010) [hereinafter Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-
Drug Patenting]; Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical 
Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1461, 1486–1507 (2009) [hereinafter Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?]; 
Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval 
Data 2001-2008: Are Canadian Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With 
Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 85, 88–104 (2009). 
 13. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 89 fig.5; C. Scott 
Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives 
and the Hatch-Waxman Act   (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working 
Paper No. 405, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 391, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1736822; C. 
Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When do Generics Challenge Drug 
Patents? 24–27 (The Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies at Columbia Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Working Paper No. 379, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640512 (noting the impact of the Hatch-Waxman act 
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multilateral and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
involving the United States.14 Recent agreements include 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS),15 as well as narrower agreements between the United 
States, Canada and Mexico,16 Australia,17 and Korea,18 among 
others.19 The latter agreements require participating nations to 
incorporate linkage and other intellectual property provisions 
in their patent systems in exchange for preferential trade 
terms20 and are increasingly negotiated outside the purview of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). As these provisions 
provide stronger intellectual property protection for drugs than 
provided for by TRIPS, they are referred to as “TRIPS-Plus.”21 
The European Commission (E.C.) Pharmaceutical Inquiry 
recently reported several instances where member nations 
have attempted to institute pharmaceutical linkage regimes 
even though European Union law prohibits linkage.22 
                                                          
on drug patenting). 
 14. Carlos María Correa, Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Access to 
Medicines, 84 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399, 399 (2006); Judit Rius 
Sanjuan, Patent-Registration Linkage, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHN. (Apr. 3, 
2006), http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo2Linkage.pdf; 
Overview on Patent Linkage, FINSTON CONSULTING, 1–2 (Aug. 7, 2006), 
http://www.finstonconsulting.com/version03/files/Overview.pdf. 
 15. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 186 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (negotiated as part of the 
Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of the World Trade Organization’s General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)). 
 16. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605. 
 17. U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 118 
Stat. 919, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/australian-fta/final-text. 
 18. Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Korea, U.S.–S. Kor., June 30, 2007 [hereinafter KorUS FTA], 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/korus-fta/final-text. The agreement between the United States 
and Korea is still pending ratification. See Prospects for Implementing the 
Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., 1 (October 
2010), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb10-23.pdf. 
 19. Correa, supra note 14, at 401. 
 20. Faunce, supra note 5, at 93–101; Thomas Faunce & Kathy Shats, 
Bilateral Trade Agreements as Drivers of National and Transnational Benefit 
from Health Technology Policy: Implications of Recent US Deals for Australian 
Negotiations with China and India, 62 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 196, 202–07, 209 
(2008). 
 21. Correa, supra note 14, at 399. 
 22. Dir. Gen. for Competition, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final 
01 BOUCHARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2011  1:37 PM 
398 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:2 
 
 
The implications of pharmaceutical linkage to global public 
health are great. For example, recent work has shown that the 
linkage regime can extend cumulative patent terms for high 
value pharmaceuticals by as much as two-fold beyond that 
provided by the basic patent covering the compound.23 This is 
consistent with early predictions of the impact of linkage on 
market exclusivity by Schondelmeyer,24 based on experience 
with the U.S. linkage regime.25 An additional concern is that 
the extension of market exclusivity on brand drugs (and thus 
prolonged monopoly pricing) occurs even though fifty to 
seventy-five percent of patents challenged may be invalid or not 
infringed by the generic equivalent.26 Moreover, the scope of 
settlements between brand-name firms and generic firms 
under linkage not only renders consumers and other payers 
worse off than if generics were to win litigation on the merits, 
but it is possible that settlements of this nature may be 
                                                          
Report, at 23, SEC (2009) 952 final (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter Final Report], 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working
_paper_part1.pdf. This theme is developed extensively in the Preliminary 
Report. Dir. Gen. for Competition, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary 
Report, 15, 113, 261 (Nov. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Preliminary Report], available 
at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_r
eport.pdf. 
 23. See Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12 at 1498. 
 24. Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a pharmacologist and health economist, 
gave evidence before the House of Commons to the effect that it is not the term 
of single patents that mattered most, but rather how patents add cumulatively 
to extend market exclusivity, a claim the government at the time vigorously 
denied. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 74 n.6. 
 25. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far? 41 IDEA 227, 233 n. 27 
(2001) (citing The Gale Group, Intellectual Property Rules: A Delicate 
Balancing Act for Drug Development, 23 CHAIN DRUG REV. RX13 (2001), 
available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3007/is_4_23/ai_n28824986/?tag=conten
t;col1). 
 26. EDWARD HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD: EVERGREENING OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE PATENTED MEDICINES 
(NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS OF CANADA’S PATENT ACT 11 (2004) 
[hereinafter HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD], available at 
http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news/docs/patently_absurd_04.pdf; FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at vii–viii; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 40 
n. 293. It should be noted, however, that this data is now somewhat old and 
requires updating for both the United States and Canada following 
amendments to the respective linkage regimes over the last half decade. 
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necessary in the long run for ‘generics to be adequately 
compensated for the risk of taking escalating litigation created 
by linkage laws. This creates a conflicting system in which 
governments with linkage regimes that limit the timely 
appearance of generics also depend on these firms to produce 
cost savings and limit the growth in pharmaceutical 
expenditures. A related issue is that costs of prolonged 
litigation are passed on to consumers,27 with differential costs 
to governments and the public in accordance with their system 
of drug reimbursement,28 public health,29 public-private 
discourse,30 and health equity.31 
Considerations such as the forgoing must be balanced 
against the widely accepted need for innovative drugs in 
developed and developing nations; the presumption of patent 
validity in nations with established patent legislation; and the 
                                                          
 27. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at 
73–77; Bulow, supra note 8, at 162–63. 
 28. EXPLORING SOCIAL INSURANCE: CAN A DOSE OF EUROPE CURE 
CANADIAN HEALTH CARE FINANCE? 2–3 (Colleen M. Flood et al. eds., 2008). 
 29. See generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG 
COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT xiii–xv (2004) 
(describing drug development preferences for follow-on drugs, drug 
evergreening practices and the high costs of prescription drugs in America); 
JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 183, 196–97 (2004) (detailing the impacts health care 
systems have on its patients and the role of follow-on drugs in dominating 
drug development); JAY S. COHEN, OVERDOSE: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG 
COMPANIES 176–94 (2001) (summarizing problems associated with the FDA, 
how this relates to drug development preferences and how these problems 
affect the public); PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, 
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION xii–xvi (2003) 
(describing the history of the Food and Drug Administration and associated 
shifts in drug development preferences); RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, 
SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS xviii (2005) (noting that there is much 
debate surrounding the ways in which drug companies have become profitable 
and the relation of profit to follow-on drugs). 
 30. See Mary E. Wiktorowicz, Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of 
Pharmaceuticals: Institutions and Interests in the United States, Canada, 
Britain, and France, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 615, 616, 620–21 (2003). 
 31. See Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring Scientific 
Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641, 
647–52 (2004); Trudo Lemmens, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Secrecy about 
Clinical Trials, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 15–16 (2004); Kevin Outterson, 
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International 
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 193–96 
(2005); Kevin Outterson, Should Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities 
Be Limited to Specific Diseases, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 279, 279–80 (2008). 
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idea in law that if the state grants a party an exclusive legal 
right, it cannot turn around and grant another party 
permission to encroach upon that right without just cause.32 
A related observation is that while the concept of 
pharmaceutical linkage is new compared to the patent system, 
there is already significant pressure to broaden it beyond drug 
approval to include linkage between patent rights and other 
regulatory aspects of drug approval and marketing.33 An 
expansive concept of linkage would differ significantly from the 
relatively discrete legal nexus between drug patents and 
marketed products envisioned by the architects of linkage in 
the United States and Canada.34 For example, the E.C. 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry35 recently articulated a broad 
definition of pharmaceutical linkage, including linkage of 
patent status to formal legal proceedings between parties; 
patent settlements; as well as a wide range of interventions 
before national drug regulators, including those relating to 
                                                          
 32. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 57–58 (2008). 
 33. See e.g., Final Report, supra note 22, at 130; Preliminary Report, 
supra note 22, at 15. 
 34. See HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 5; Bouchard, I’m Still 
Your Baby, supra note 5, at 138–39; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 4–7. 
For elaboration, see also discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 35. Final Report, supra note 22, at 480 (“The Commission will continue to 
strictly enforce the applicable Community law and, for instance, act against 
patent linkage, as according to Community legislation, marketing 
authorisation bodies cannot take the patent status of the originator medicine 
into account when deciding on marketing authorisations of generic 
medicines.”). In the Preliminary Report, the E.C. stated more specifically that 
patent-linkage is considered unlawful under Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 
and Directive (EC) No. 2001/83. Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 14. 
Further elaboration is provided to the effect that 
Patent linkage refers to the practice of linking the granting of MA, 
the pricing and reimbursement status or any regulatory approval for 
a generic medicinal product, to the status of a patent (application) for 
the originator reference product. Under EU law, it is not allowed to 
link marketing authorisation to the patent status of the originator 
reference product. Article 81 of the Regulation and Article 126 of the 
Directive provide that authorisation to market a medicinal product 
shall not be refused, suspended or revoked except on the grounds set 
out in the Regulation and the Directive. Since the status of a patent 
(application) is not included in the grounds set out in the Regulation 
and in the Directive, it cannot be used as an argument for refusing, 
suspending or revoking MA. 
Final Report, supra note 22, at 130 (citations omitted). 
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market approval, drug pricing, and reimbursement.36 
Moreover, a growing number of legal disputes have been 
reported whereby countries without linkage have attempted to 
import or export drugs. In some instances, the drug shipments 
are seized by other nations who allege that the shipments are 
in violation of domestic patent laws linked to international 
trade instruments such as TRIPS or other FTAs.37 
An evolving landscape such as that reviewed thus far 
raises the question of whether the pharmaceutical industry is 
using linkage as an emerging stepping-stone in its efforts to 
reach across global borders to establish a uniform intellectual 
property regime in a distinctly non-uniform world. In this way, 
linkage regulations in respect of therapeutic products, have 
quietly emerged as a powerful driver of drug regulation, access 
to essential medication, and public health costs on the global 
stage. 
III. METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
When the group began its work, the obvious question to 
ask was, what should the focus be of future research on 
pharmaceutical linkage as it evolves over time from its North 
American roots? We noted with interest that the study of 
structure-function relationships in living systems, both at the 
micro and macro levels, has served the life sciences especially 
well over the last century. Structure-function analyses in the 
life sciences have led to numerous key insights into molecular, 
cellular, tissue, organ, and whole body functioning over the last 
half-century. For example, structure-function studies have 
                                                          
 36. In the Preliminary Report, the E.C. noted that 
Interventions before regulatory bodies (marketing authorisation 
authorities and pricing and reimbursement bodies) appear to be a 
standard tool in originator companies’ toolbox. Although contacting 
the health authorities may address legitimate concerns, it can also be 
used to delay or block the marketing authorisation or the pricing or 
reimbursement status of the generic product. In particular, by 
suggesting that the generic product is less efficient or safe or is not 
equivalent, raising patent infringement issues concerning the generic 
product in question and alleging that any decision favourable to the 
generic company would make the authorities liable to patent 
infringement damages (patent linkage), originator companies gain 
time and can create delays in granting marketing approval for the 
generic product and its entry into the market. 
Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 314. 
 37. See, e.g., WTO Dispute over Seized Drug Shipment, PHARMALETTER 
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/91762/wto-dispute-over-
seized-drug-shipment.html. 
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yielded detailed descriptions of drug, chemical and hormonal 
receptors, cell membrane and intracellular constituents, second 
messenger systems, chemical and hormonal mediation of intra-
organ and inter-organ function. More recently, functional 
imaging techniques have revealed a remarkable degree of brain 
plasticity in the context of congenital and acquired disease 
states, including under circumstances where dysfunction was 
previously thought to be permanent. 
As demonstrated by pioneering work in general systems 
theory and systems biology over the last half century, the 
interaction between structural and functional elements in a 
system is bi-directional; that is, not only does structure 
influence function, but function also influences structure. As 
discussed further below, this occurs through various feedback 
mechanisms. The structure-function paradigm applies 
fundamentally to law in two ways. First, because governments 
have specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting law 
and regulations, and these goals are expressed in the form of 
discrete legal and regulatory language. Second because policy 
goals and statutory language employed by governments and 
administrative bodies are reviewable by the courts in judicial 
review and other proceedings and are often revisited by 
governments in the context of their law reform efforts. 
The rapid spread of pharmaceutical linkage worldwide 
offers a unique and time sensitive opportunity to carry out 
empirical work on the system as it evolves globally, from its 
original locus in North America. A major goal of our work on 
global pharmaceutical linkage is to investigate the structural 
and functional aspects of different systems of linkage 
regulations and their relationship to drug availability costs and 
expenditures, balanced with incentives for innovation and 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
As in other complex political, legal and economic systems,38 
the pharmaceutical linkage network is assumed to have 
                                                          
 38. ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL LIFE 260 (1997); Ravi Bhavnani, Agent Based Models in the Study of 
Ethnic Norms and Violence, in COMPLEXITY IN WORLD POLITICS: CONCEPTS 
AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM 121, 127 (Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006); 
Barry Bozeman, Public-Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do, 63 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 145, 154 (2002); Barry Bozeman & Daniel Sarewitz, Public 
Values and Public Failure in US Science Policy, 32 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 127 
(2005); John D. Sterman, All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a 
Systems Scientist, 18 SYS. DYNAMICS REV. 501, 524–26 (2002). 
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structural and functional characteristics that can be identified 
and measured. These quantified characteristics, can then, in 
turn, serve as appropriate benchmarks to assess the 
performance of the system relative to its goals and objectives. 
Key decision makers, including brand and generic 
pharmaceutical firms, the courts, patent counsel, consumers, 
payers, and other actors, are assumed to interact in domestic 
and global networks through reasonably well-defined channels 
of communication.39 Complex systems are characterized by 
broad rules that have increasing applicability and universality 
as the symmetry and elegance of the rules increase.40 Indeed, 
previous work has demonstrated that this principle applies to 
innovation ecologies regulated by law,41 particularly those where 
large-scale public and private rights revolving around technology 
must be balanced.42 
We use the term “structural” in this Article to refer to the 
broad administrative, legal, and policy attributes of the linkage 
regime in differing jurisdictions. Together, these attributes 
form the initial starting conditions for operation of linkage 
regimes. The initial starting conditions, as in dynamical 
physical systems, represent the sum of the political, economic, 
and public policy conditions that together form the “take-off” 
point for a new law and the conditions in which this law begins 
to operate.43 The structural aspect also encompasses the 
                                                          
 39. See generally Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical 
Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 423–24 (2004) 
(describing the concept of “nodal governance” and its relation to general 
systems theories). 
 40. See generally MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR: 
ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX 370–71 (1994). The practical 
implications of elegance and symmetry in physics and mathematics are 
explored elegantly by Gell-Mann in a videocast on the subject. See Murray 
Gell-Mann, Beauty and Truth in Physics: Murray Gell-Mann on TED.com, 
TED BLOG (Dec. 6, 2007), http://blog.ted.com/2007/12/murray_gellmann.php. 
 41. See Fred Gault & Sasanne Huttner, Commentary, A Cat’s Cradle for 
Policy, 455 NATURE 462 (2008); David H. Guston, Commentary, Innovation 
Policy: Not Just Jumbo Shrimp, 454 NATURE 940, (2008); William Wulf, 
Editorial, Changes in Innovation Ecology, 316 SCI. 1253 (2007). 
 42. Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12, at 1513–15; 
Drahos, supra note 39; J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It 
possible?, (2005) 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 25–27 (2005) [hereinafter Ruhl 
2005]. 
 43. ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED 
TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 93–107 (2003); JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW 
SCIENCE 241–73 (1988); JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTATION IN NATURAL AND 
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specific legal mechanisms that drive operation of linkage 
regimes in various jurisdictions. Identifying the structural 
attributes and mechanisms of individual linkage systems is 
important; as combined they provide the benchmark from 
which to assess the successes and failures of local systems in 
operation and their potential to combine to form a global and 
integrated regulatory regime. 
Our research thus far has identified a number of important 
structural aspects of pharmaceutical linkage, including: 
assessment in each jurisdiction of the original policy intent 
underpinning the linkage regime; the manner in which public 
health policy and economic policy is perceived by governments 
and the courts to converge or diverge through the linkage 
vector; the legal checks and balances found within the linkage 
regime designed specifically to maintain balance between the 
interests of brand and generic firms; the provisions in addition 
to linkage that were included in enabling legislation; the 
growing expansion of the linkage concept beyond the drug 
approval-drug patenting nexus to encompass that between 
patenting and international trade mechanisms; and how 
pharmaceutical linkage is in the process of informing the 
construction of new laws pertaining to follow-on biologics. 
We use the term “functional” to refer to the outputs of the 
regulations in each jurisdiction, as well as how these outputs 
functionally interact across borders to operate as a coherent 
global regulatory regime. The functional aspects reflect the 
behavior of the system as it evolves with time away from the 
initial starting conditions,44 in this case the U.S. Hatch-
Waxman regime. The functional aspects we have identified to 
                                                          
ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS 6–9 (1992); JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW 
ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 60 (1992); cf. STEVEN JOHNSON, 
EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 
104–10 (2001); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH 
FOR THE LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 75–82 (1995); see also 
GREGOIRE NICOLIS & ILYA PRIGOGINE, EXPLORING COMPLEXITY: AN 
INTRODUCTION (1989); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING 
SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992); W. Brian Arthur, Positive 
Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92 (1990). 
 44. Harrison, supra note 9, at 491–95 (2001); see also LES JOHNSTON & 
CLIFFORD SHEARING, GOVERNING SECURITY: EXPLORATIONS IN POLICING AND 
JUSTICE 138–61 (2003); Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance, and 
Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 357 (2004); Clifford Shearing & Jennifer Wood, 
Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens’, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 400, 
401–06. 
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study include: the impact of linkage regulations on the 
development of new and innovative drugs; the manner in which 
this is balanced by the timely entry of generic drugs; the degree 
to which market exclusivity is or can be extended solely by 
operation of the linkage regime; how brand firms use the 
linkage system in order to extend market exclusivity on high 
value drugs; the costs to consumers or other payers of extended 
exclusivity; the costs of extended exclusivity based on patents 
that are ultimately found to be invalid or not infringed; the 
impact of differing mechanisms of regulatory oversight on drug 
pricing and reimbursement; and the role of empirical studies 
for the legitimacy of linkage regulations. 
Complex legal, scientific, medical, and economic issues 
such as those encompassed by the linkage regime lend 
themselves well to study by a network, or consortium of 
scholars and practicing lawyers.45 A unique advantage of a 
network-based approach is that studying linkage in different 
jurisdictions allows for both: (1) an investigation of the 
structural and functional characteristics of local linkage 
regimes with different initial starting conditions and different 
legal mechanisms of operation; and (2) the identification of 
general rules of linkage as the different national forms of 
linkage interact and influence global pharmaceutical 
regulation. The former provides a descriptive mechanism for 
assessing the successes and failures of different regimes while 
the latter provides a prescriptive approach for key decision 
makers to revise, institute or abolish linkage regulations 
according to the goals and objectives of differing nations. 
The objective of our research is to produce and utilize 
empirical knowledge relating to different linkage regimes as a 
knowledge translation tool for assessing the strengths, 
weaknesses, successes, and failures of pharmaceutical linkage 
in individual nations and how they combine to form a global 
                                                          
 45. The authors represent nations with mature linkage regulations 
(United States, Canada), nascent regulations (Australia, China), those without 
regulations but with certain practices that operate to parallel linkage (E.U.), 
and those where both the existence and scope of linkage regulations are the 
subject of intense public scrutiny (India, Mexico, South Korea). The analytical 
framework presented in this Article was originally conceived as an application 
for funding to the primary Canadian medical research funding agency, which 
was not successful. However, the authors hope the work produced by the 
consortium is of assistance to the global intellectual property bar and national 
governments in their respective deliberations regarding pharmaceutical 
linkage. 
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system of pharmaceutical linkage. Different economic, public 
health, and political systems present a different set of initial 
starting conditions not only for the de novo operation of linkage 
regulations in each jurisdiction as they come into force, but also 
for how these systems evolve, grow, and adapt to changing 
conditions over time. Indeed, our early data suggests 
substantial differences between jurisdictions in this regard. 
These differences may be fundamentally responsible for the 
opposition of certain nations and economic regions to 
pharmaceutical linkage, and the varying degrees of success of 
those employing them with the twin policy goals of encouraging 
the development of new and innovative drugs, while also 
facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs and access to 
essential medications. 
IV. STRUCTURAL & FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL LINKAGE 
A. ORIGINAL POLICY INTENT 
An excellent starting point for a global analysis of 
pharmaceutical linkage is the “original policy intent” 
underpinning linkage in differing jurisdictions. Original policy 
intent presents a critical issue for determination of whether or 
not legislation is intra vires or ultra vires, as governments have 
specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting laws and 
regulations that are reviewable by the courts.46 
A number of questions arise as relevant to original policy 
intent as it pertains to different forms of linkage. In practice 
these can, and typically do, vary substantially from one nation 
to the next. This is not surprising given the differing political, 
economic, and technological landscapes involved. A related 
issue is when the policy grounds put forward are similar in 
varying jurisdictions, but the legal mechanisms underpinning 
operation of the linkage regime differ, with potentially varying 
outputs. How do the grounds offered in support of linkage 
relate to other mechanisms for intellectual property protection 
for pharmaceuticals, such as data protection, patent term 
extension, etc.? Have the mechanisms favoring legal protection 
                                                          
 46. Cameron Hutchinson, Which Kraft of Statutory Interpretation? A 
Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law, 46 ALTA. L. 
REV. 1, 7, 20 (2008). 
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of pharmaceutical products been balanced by other 
mechanisms in favor of price control? Our preliminary analysis 
indicates significant differences among jurisdictions. Some 
jurisdictions favor strong intellectual property protection and 
linkage regulations without price controls, some are 
considering price controls, and some express forms of anti-
evergreening provisions47 balanced with regulation of generic 
drug prices. 
For example, in the United States where the linkage 
regime first came into force, the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was explicitly to balance two competing policy objectives: 
inducing brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments 
necessary to research and develop new drug products, while 
enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those 
drugs to market as soon as possible.48 Indeed, during free trade 
negotiations leading up to linkage in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia,49 claims were made that linkage 
regulations were necessary to provide incentives to firms to 
engage in high risk research and development. In each 
instance, universities were particularly keen to hitch their 
wagon to the regulations.50 Senator Hatch, at the time the 
American legislation came into force said “[t]he public receives 
the best of both worlds - cheaper drugs today and better drugs 
                                                          
 47. Evergreening “is a potentially perjorative term that generally refers to 
the strategy of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the 
same product, typically by obtaining patents on improved versions of existing 
products.” John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., R40917, Patent 
“Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition 1 (2009). 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984); Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 
268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Young, 920 F.2d 
984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (“These provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments ‘emerged from Congress’ efforts to balance two conflicting policy 
objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to make the 
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while 
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those 
drugs to market.”’). 
 49. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 75–76 
(documenting an empirical study with a specific emphasis on Canada’s 
pharmaceutical linkage regulatory regime and its operation within the 
Canadian legal system); Faunce & Lexchin, supra note 5, at 4–8 (outlining the 
development of pharmaceutical linkage in Australia); Harrison, supra note 9, 
at 473–77 (detailing negotiations between the United States and Canada that 
involved changes to Canadian patent law in service of NAFTA and TRIPS); 
Tancer, supra note 9, at 285–87 (describing historical factors leading to 
pharmaceutical linkage in Canada). 
 50. See, e.g., Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 100 (speaking 
directly to Canadian Universities); Tancer, supra note 9, at 290. 
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tomorrow.”51 The same is true in Canada, as outlined clearly in 
the government’s Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements on 
the topic.52 Therefore, in addition to stimulating pioneering 
drug development, a second major policy goal of linkage was to 
facilitate timely generic entry.53 
However, while the policy goals may be similar, the factual 
baseline for legislation may differ significantly in different 
nations, with the result that outcomes may change accordingly. 
The United States and Canada present an excellent case study 
in this regard. Prior to linkage in the Unites States, a large 
number of drugs were off patent yet not marketed by generics 
due in large part to regulatory costs resulting from the inability 
to rely on the data in the original approval.54 This mechanism 
was eventually provided by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 
which resulted in,  notwithstanding a certain level of gaming of 
                                                          
 51. Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 8, at 11 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. 
S23,764 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)). 
 52. Evidence of legislative intent regarding the “original policy intent” of 
encouraging development of new and innovative drugs can be found in both 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS) and related Guidance 
Documents. See Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations, 138 CAN. GAZE. PART I 3718, 3723, available at 
http://www.gazette.gc.ca/archives/p1/2004/2004-12-11/pdf/g1-13850.pdf; 
MINISTER OF HEALTH, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE 
OF COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS [hereinafter GUIDANCE DOCUMENT], available 
at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/pdf/prodpharma/applic-
demande/guide-ld/patmedbrev/pmreg3_mbreg3-eng.pdf. An articulation of the 
government’s pharmaceutical policy as it relates to the Notice of Compliance 
(NOC) Regulations can be found in the 2006 RIAS, which states: 
The Government’s pharmaceutical patent policy seeks to balance 
effective patent enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the 
timely market entry of their lower priced generic competitors. The 
current manner in which that balance is realized was established in 
1993, with the enactment of Bill C-91, the Patent Act Amendment 
Act, 1992, S.C. 1993, c. 2. 
Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12, at 181 n.44. 
 53. Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: 
Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 633–34 (2005). 
 54. For example, in the United States generics could not use NDA holder’s 
data to demonstrate safety and efficacy and were forced to conduct clinical 
trials to support market authorization. Avery, supra note 8, at 174–75. Before 
Hatch-Waxman, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration demonstrated that 
approximately 150 brand drugs were on the market with expired patents, but 
with no generic equivalents. This resulted in hundreds of million dollars in out 
of pocket consumer expenditures. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27–33 (1984). 
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the system,55 the United States developing a strong generic 
industry that is paralleled by a strong brand pharmaceutical 
industry. In contrast, Canada had a substantial domestic 
generic industry prior to linkage predicated, in part, by 
provisions allowing for compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceuticals.56 The result of linkage in Canada, as some 
have claimed, is a diminished generic industry.57 However, 
since many of the companies are privately held and do not 
disclose detailed financial data, this claim cannot be verified. 
Linkage, however, has not led to any change in the level of 
global competitiveness for national life science firms as 
originally anticipated,58 and in fact Merck has recently closed 
its main Canadian research laboratory.59 
Given that the second and third entrant linkage regimes, 
Canada and Australia respectively, are separated by a decade, 
it is reasonable to conclude the Canadian linkage regime was 
viewed as a kind of “test case” for American trade negotiators. 
Further, it is reasonable to say, given the available evidence, 
that this discrete and time-gated yet natural experiment has 
been a success. Of interest, 25 years after Hatch-Waxman, a 
similar situation is currently developing in India and, perhaps, 
Italy. The former nation, which like Canada prior to linkage is 
home to a well-developed generic drug industry, is in the midst 
of an intense legal battle over whether or not to institute some 
form of pharmaceutical linkage.60 In contrast to the debates 
                                                          
 55. Bulow, supra note 8, at 159–73; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 14; 
Aidan Hollis, Closing the FDA’s Orange Book, REG., Winter 2007, at 14–17, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n4/v24n4-2.pdf; Avery, 
supra note 8, at 172. 
 56. Harrison, supra note 9, at 487–60; Tancer supra note 9, at 283–84. 
 57. See HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 3; Lexchin, supra note 
5, at 72–73; Joel Lexchin, Intellectual Property Rights and the Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Where Do We Go from Here?, 35 INT’L. J. 
HEALTH SERV. 237, 243 (2005). 
 58. Cf. EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, PEOPLE & EXCELLENCE: 
THE HEART OF SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIALIZATION 6, 17 (2006) [hereinafter 
EXPERT PANEL], available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/Iu4-78-
2006E-I.pdf (documenting Canada’s struggle to improve their productivity 
growth). 
 59. Quebec Merck closure could mean ‘brain drain’: Pharmaceutical giant 
shuts 16 facilities, including Montreal-area research facility, CBCNEWS (July 
8, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2010/07/08/merck-
closures.html. 
 60. In 2008, Bayer moved the Delhi High Court to seek a declaration 
against the drug regulatory authority, Drug Controller General of India 
(DCGI). See Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009 (Delhi H.C.) (India). 
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over the reach of linkage in Canada, Australia and India, the 
law relating to linkage in Mexico has been interpreted 
explicitly to encompass the link between market authorization 
and patents.61 Linkage has recently been interpreted by the 
Mexican Supreme Court to include not only active ingredient 
patents, but also patents covering pharmaceutical 
formulations.62 Processes are still expressly excluded in Mexico; 
the inclusion of patents covering uses remains hotly contested. 
In this particular case, the policy intent does not seem to be 
derived from compliance with international treaties but instead 
for coherence within the system, where exclusive rights granted 
by government through a patent are not invaded through a 
marketing authorization granted by a separate branch of the 
same government. 
In addition to jurisdictional variability in the 
establishment of the generic drug industry prior to linkage, 
another major comparative issue that we have identified is the 
use of the Bolar, or “safe harbor,” provision as a policy lever in 
pharmaceutical linkage regimes.63 The impetus for a focus on 
the Bolar provision is that the legal nexus between drug 
approval and drug patenting under linkage can trace its history 
                                                          
The Court directed the DCGI to refrain from passing an order of market 
approval for an Indian generic company, Cipla for its generic version of the 
drug ‘Soranib.’ Id. para. 7. Bayer based its arguments on the assertion that 
Section two of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act read with section forty-eight of the 
Patents Act provided for the concept of patent linkage. Id. para. 8. Justice 
Ravindra Bhatt dismissed Bayer’s arguments for creating linkage between 
patent grants and marketing approvals. Id. para. 7. Bayer appealed the 
decision of the Single Judge before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. 
Id. para. 1. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal. Id. para. 37. Bayer filed 
an appeal from decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court to the 
Supreme Court of India; the Supreme Court dismissed Bayer’s appeal refusing 
to interfere with the finding of the High Court of Delhi. India: Supreme Court 
Dismisses Bayer’ Petition in Patent Linkage Matter, GENERIC PHARM. & IP 
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://genericpharmaceuticals.blogspot.com/2010/12/india-
supreme-court-dismisses-bayer.html. 
 61. See Luis C. Schmidt, Mexico moves to improve Pharmaceutical Product 
Registration Process, OLIVARES & CIA, 
http://www.olivares.com.mx/Knowledge/Articles/CopyrightArticles/Mexicomov
estoimprovePharmaceuticalProductRegistrationProcess (last visited June 13, 
2011). 
 62. Juan Serrano, Mexican Supreme Court Decides on Broad 
Interpretation of Linkage Regulations, PATENT DOCS (Mar. 9, 2010, 11:43 PM), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/03/mexican-supreme-court-decides-on-broad-
interpretation-of-linkage-regulations.html. 
 63. See infra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
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back to insertion of early working provisions into the 
infringement section of patent legislation in the United States 
and Canada. As discussed further below the Bolar provision 
was also a focus in the decision by Indian appellate courts to 
reject linkage. For this reason, the law and policy relating to 
the Bolar provision is pivotal to the analysis of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of pharmaceutical linkage as a policy vehicle. 
Despite the “scant legislative history” underpinning the 
linkage regime,64 the U.S. Committee on Energy and 
Commerce (CEC) noted, in its influential report, that the locus 
of the legal nexus between drug approval and drug patenting 
under Hatch-Waxman was specifically through the 
infringement section of patent legislation. In this manner, 
approval and marketing of generic substitutes was 
fundamentally linked to patents associated with new and 
innovative drugs developed by brand pharmaceutical firms. As 
to which patents were considered relevant to the generic 
substitute, the CEC stated the law would be aimed at 
protecting the first product patent per drug or, if there was no 
product patent, the first process patent. In addition, the CEC 
recognized that “in some instances” (e.g., situations where 
there were product and use patents relevant to an existing 
marketed product as opposed to only a product patent) the 
listing of multiple patents on the patent register would be 
foreseeable.65 
                                                          
 64. Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(noting that the “scant legislative history” did not allow defendants to find 
congressional intent to create a private action to delist a patent from the 
Orange Book). 
 65. H.R. REP NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 22 (1984) (acknowledging that multiple 
patents would be listed on the patent register to delay generic entry). 
Specifically, the Committee recognized two different types of patents being 
properly listed on the patent register. These included 
[A]ll product patents which claim the listed drug and all use patents 
which claim an indication for the drug for which the applicant is 
seeking approval (hereafter described as a controlling use patent), the 
applicant must certify, in his opinion and to the best of his knowledge, 
as to one of four circumstances. . . . [T]he Committee recognize[d] that 
in some instances an applicant will have to make multiple 
certifications with respect to product or controlling use patents. For 
example, if the product patent has expired and a valid controlling use 
patent will not expire for three years, then the applicant must certify 
that one patent has expired and the other will expire in three years. 
The Committee intends that the applicant make the appropriate 
certification for each product and controlling use patent. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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The balance of the early working exemption favoring 
generics gauged against the ability of brand firms to commence 
legal action prior to generic marketing was viewed by the CEC 
to “fairly balance” the rights of brand patent owners with those 
of generic entrants that wish to contest the validity and/or 
infringement of a patent before such patents expire.66 No 
further protection for brand firms was deemed needed in view 
of other incentives to firms for innovative drug development. 
While allowing for multiple patents to be listed on the 
register, the CEC nevertheless explicitly noted that the ability 
of brand firms to delay generic entry using the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments should be narrow both in scope and time; the 
proper time for generic entry being “the expiration date of the 
valid patent covering the original product” and that “there 
should be no other direct or indirect method of extending 
patent term.”67 The extension of patent protection was viewed 
to be effectively and directly accomplished by Title II of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments allowing for patent term 
restoration.68 The standard for listing is that a claim of patent 
infringement “could reasonably be asserted.”69 The legal nexus 
between drug approval and drug patenting under the Canadian 
linkage regime also operates through the infringement section 
                                                          
 66. Id. at 28. The Committee noted 
[T]his additional remedy permits the commencement of a legal action 
for patent infringement before the generic drug maker has begun 
marketing. The Committee believes this procedure fairly balances the 
rights of a patent owner to prevent others from making, using, or 
selling its patented product and the rights of third parties to contest 
the validity of a patent or to market a product which they believe is 
not claimed by the patent. 
Id. 
 67. Id. at 46. The Committee elaborated, stating that 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress 
to grant exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time. That 
limited time should be a definite time and, thereafter, immediate 
competition should be encouraged. For That reason, Title I of the bill 
permits the filing of abbreviated new drug applications before a 
patent expires and contemplates that the effective approval date will 
be the expiration date of the valid patent covering the original 
product. Other sections of Title II permit the extension of the term of 
a patent for a definite time provided certain conditions are met. There 
should be no other direct or indirect method of extending patent term. 
Id. 
 68. Id. at 17–18. 
 69. Id. at 31. 
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of relevant patent legislation.70 Thus, in order to assess the 
effectiveness of linkage as a policy lever one must do so through 
the lens of the Bolar provision as it works in tandem with 
infringement law and other legislation intended to encourage 
the development of new and innovative drugs, while also 
facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs.71 For these 
reasons, linkage legislation balances competing policy 
interests.72 
As well described in the literature, the Bolar provision 
enshrined in the safe harbor provision of Hatch-Waxman73 
allows “early working” of patented inventions prior to generic 
entry. While the terms Bolar provision and early working 
provision are often used conterminously, recent jurisprudence 
suggests that one may be enfolded within the other and not 
vice-versa.74 As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Merck v. 
Integra, the purpose of safe harbor is to protect basic research 
and development activities that contribute to the generation of 
information required by drug regulators in order to approve a 
new drug product.75 The safe harbor provision can be compared 
to the Bolar provision, which is more narrowly aimed at 
facilitating timely generic entry after patent protection for a 
new product expires. In language reminiscent of that employed 
by the High Court of Dehli in Bayer v. India to reject linkage, 
the court in Roche v. Bolar denied the request to be exempt 
from patent infringement proceedings, in order to work-up the 
generic product ahead of patent expiry.76 Shortly after Bolar 
                                                          
 70. See generally Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, para. 33, 58 (Can.) (discussing the procedural steps that 
must be followed by generic producers pursuant to the Patent Act and the 
‘patent-specific’ analysis necessary to interpret the linkage regulations); 
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 
para. 27, 37–39 (Can.) (discussing the obligations of generic manufacturers 
and the “early working” exception to patent infringement and reinforcing the 
‘patent-specific’ analysis of linkage first established in Biolyse v. BMS, supra.). 
 71. See Biolyse Pharma Corp., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, para. 133. 
 72. See Id. at para. 133, 189. 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). 
 74. Merk KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). Justice Nichols stated 
Bolar argues that even if no established doctrine exists with which it 
can escape liability for patent infringement, public policy requires 
that we create a new exception to the use prohibition. Parties and 
amici seem to think, in particular, that we must resolve a conflict 
between the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), and the 
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was released, however, the U.S. Congress enacted an exception 
to the patent infringement rule, for uses “reasonably related to 
the development and submission of information,” in order to 
facilitate timely generic entry by reducing the regulatory lag 
for bioequivalence testing and regulatory approval.77 
It is reasonable to speculate that the policy grounds, 
expected outcomes and outputs, and legal mechanisms 
underpinning brand and generic drug development pathways 
do, and indeed should, differ. To begin with, it seems 
reasonable to state that as a policy vehicle the safe harbor 
provision extends beyond the scope of Bolar to facilitate generic 
entry. For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Justice Scalia held that § 
271(e)(1) protected all basic research leading up to and 
“reasonably related” to the process of developing information 
for a regulatory submission. Justice Scalia noted specifically 
that the safe harbor provision was not limited in scope to be so 
narrow as to only support an abbreviated new drug application 
(ANDA), or generic submission.78 
                                                          
Patent Act of 1952, or at least the Acts’ respective policies and 
purposes. We decline the opportunity here, however, to engage in 
legislative activity proper only for the Congress. 
Id. (citations omitted). But see Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, 
para. 14 (Delhi H.C.) (India) (finding that linkage prevents competition and 
contradicts public health policy). 
 77. See Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 195. The Court in Merck found, “[i]t is 
generally an act of patent infringement to ‘mak[e], us[e], offe[r] to sell, or sel[l] 
any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent therefor.’” Id. 
(alternations in original). Further, Justice Scalia went on to quote the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological 
product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) . . . ) solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs . . . . 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, § 202, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)). 
 78. Id. at 206. The Court stated 
The statutory text does not require such a result. Congress did not 
limit § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor to the development of information for 
inclusion in a submission to the FDA; nor did it create an exemption 
applicable only to the research relevant to filing an ANDA for 
approval of a generic drug. Rather, it exempted from infringement all 
uses of patented compounds “reasonably related” to the process of 
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Reading Merck together with Bolar and the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments, it seems that while the safe harbor 
provision of § 271(e)(1) is intended to facilitate generic entry, 
the scope of the provision as an exception to patent 
infringement is broader and more inclusive; it encourages 
research and development into both new and generic drugs 
more broadly. On the one hand, the provision protects research 
activities on new and innovative therapeutic products from 
infringement litigation by patent owners in circumstances 
where such research can reasonably lead to a regulatory 
submission.79 In the absence of such a safe harbor, research of 
this nature would be chilled to the detriment of both 
competition and the public.80 On the other hand, the provision 
also protects generic firms from infringement while working-up 
their regulatory submissions. However, it does not necessarily 
follow that if a certain scope of patents is subject to the safe 
harbor of § 271(e)(1) to encourage innovation, an equally broad 
scope of patents must be included under the linkage umbrella 
in order to delay generic entry on older drugs. 
While Bolar is maintained as legal justification for linkage 
in the United States,81 Canada,82 and elsewhere (such as the 
                                                          
developing information for submission under any federal law 
regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs. We decline 
to read the “reasonable relation” requirement so narrowly as to 
render § 271(e)(1)’s stated protection of activities leading to FDA 
approval for all drugs illusory. Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves 
adequate space for experimentation and failure on the road to 
regulatory approval: At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable 
basis for believing that a patented compound may work, through a 
particular biological process, to produce a particular physiological 
effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be 
appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 
“reasonably related” to the “development and submission of 
information under . . . Federal law.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 79. See id. at 206–07. 
 80. See Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1, supra note 4, at 243 (“The 
Solicitor General stated in its KSR brief that SCOTUS jurisprudence stood for 
the historical proposition that the obviousness requirement is critical to 
ensure free exploitation of ideas is the rule, to which the protection of a federal 
patent is the exception.”); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
419 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Royal 
Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc. 168 F.2d 691 (2nd Cir. 1948); 
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, para. 37 (Can.); Free 
World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024 (Can.). 
 81. See Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 206–07; Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 
268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 82. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 73–74. 
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European Union, India, and Mexico),83 the policy grounds have 
never been elucidated as to how or indeed why infringement 
law may be properly used to extend beyond early working of a 
patent on a particular drug, to linkage with many patents on 
many drugs.84 For example, the rationale used to support 
linkage in Canada was that generic entry would occur on expiry 
of the “main patent” on a given product.85 The maximum delay 
for generic products was claimed to be equal to that for generic 
approval prior to linkage, or two to three years.86 No legal 
mechanism or policy grounds were offered to prohibit generic 
entry based on the expiry of multiple patents that relate to the 
new and innovative drug only distantly in time, particularly 
the expiry of multiple patents on multiple related drug forms 
(tablet “following on” capsule form, monohydrate “following on” 
dihydrate crystalline form, besylate salt “following on” 
mesylate salt form, enantiomer “following” on racemic mixture, 
etc.).87 Provisions enabling the extension of market exclusivity 
in this manner only appeared once the regulations 
accompanying amendments to patent legislation were 
                                                          
 83. See generally Final Report, supra note 22, at 122 (July 8, 2009) (noting 
that a Bolar provision was introduced into the EU regulatory framework in 
2004, and that “‘the research exemption’ originally foreseen in the Community 
Patent Convention as a general exemption from patent infringement for ‘acts 
done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented 
invention’ was widely adopted in the national patent legislations of EU 
Member States.”); Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 7–8 (the 
court denied Bayer Corporation’s request for the Drug Controller General of 
India to withhold a drug license to another company, holding that the 
argument against patent linkage was based on the notion that the entry of 
generic drugs resulted in saving of expenditure and health costs, and that 
“[s]uch linkage would undermine the ‘Bolar/Early Working’ of the patent and 
deny space for generic medicines.”). 
 84. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 112–13, 115–21. 
 85. See id. at 120 (the federal government testified to the Parliamentary 
Committee stating that “a new and innovative drug was said to have ‘[one] 
main patent’ and ‘w[h]en that main patent expires, anyone may copy that 
product and bring it to market.’” (quoting Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:8 Parliament of 
Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) (alteration in original)). 
 86. See id. at 94 (“It is reasonable to speculate however that ‘but for’ the 
existence of the linkage regime that generic entry may have occurred closer to 
expiry of the originating patent or patents . . . with an accordingly short period 
of delayed entry. . . . the linkage regime has proved to be a highly effective 
mechanism for extending market monopolies on profitable drugs.”). 
 87. See id. at 112–13 (discussing the response to concerns that multiple 
patents could be listed on the patent register). 
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published.88 
The idea that only a “main patent” should be protected is 
congruent with the statement by the CEC to the effect that the 
appropriate time for generic entry was the expiration date of 
the valid patent covering the original product and that there 
should be no further method of extending patent term. In light 
of the statement by the Federal Circuit in Mylan that Hatch-
Waxman not only creates the statutory act of infringement but 
also defines the conditions under which a defense to 
infringement is available, the number and scope of patents 
listed on the patent register is crucial to assessing whether the 
legislation is working consistent with its objective of balancing 
the competing policy objectives of stimulating innovative 
research and enhancing generic entry.89 
In light of the above discussion it is somewhat curious that 
both the courts and (various) government branches responsible 
for bringing into force the originating linkage regimes in North 
America have remained largely silent on the policy grounds 
underpinning the multiple patent listing model, other than to 
say generally that it fairly balances the rights of brand patent 
owners with those of generic entrants under certain narrow 
conditions.90 
Given the lack of policy debate combined with the 
significant public health implications involved, it is not 
surprising that some Appellate Courts have taken a dim view 
of unduly broadening the drug approval―drug patenting 
nexus, to the detriment of generic entry. The Supreme Court of 
Canada, in its leading decisions on linkage—Biolyse91 and 
AstraZeneca92—narrowly construed its analysis on the breadth 
of drug submissions and patent listing within the terms of the 
                                                          
 88. See id. at 134–35 (“[The] linkage regime has only been in existence for 
about 25 years following passage of . . . the Canadian NOC regulations in 
1993.”). 
 89. Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d at 1331, 1331 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (stating that the Amendments “were made both to the FFDCA [(the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)] and to Title 35 of the United States 
Code relating to patents.”). 
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984); see also discussion supra 
note 66. 
 91. See Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
533, para. 5 (Can.). 
 92. See AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2004] F.C. 
1278, para. 40–41 (Can.). 
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Patent Act.93 The court in AstraZeneca held that under the 
Notice of Compliance (NOC) Regulations it was necessary to 
undertake a “patent-specific analysis” rather than a broad 
inclusive reading of the terms “drug submission” and “patent 
listing,” which would enable the undue prolonging of market 
exclusivity.94 This holding was taken to be consistent with that 
of the quid pro quo traditional patent bargain.95 
In Bayer v. India, the High Court of Delhi went one step 
further, holding that the North American model of linkage, 
encompassing as it does multiple patents listed per drug or 
groupings of related drugs, would undermine the early working 
aspect of Bolar, deny space for generic drugs in the 
marketplace, and mitigate the positive impact of generic drugs 
on healthcare expenditures and costs.96 The court based its 
decision in part based on the finding that patent linkage is a 
“TRIPS-Plus” concept and that India had only signed on to 
TRIPS. Justice Muralindhar noted for the court that 
“[w]orldwide there is a raging debate on whether patent 
linkage should be permitted. There is no uniformity in the 
policy of different countries . . . .”97 Earlier in the decision, 
Judge Muralindhar noted that there was a growing opinion in 
developed countries, including the European Union, that 
cautioned against linkage. 98 
Based on a sort of ‘middle way’ reading of appellate cases 
                                                          
 93. See Patent Act R.S.C. 1985, c.P-4, available at 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/P/P-4.pdf. 
 94. See AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 
S.C.R. 560, para. 39 (Can.) (“Given the evident . . . commercial strategy of the 
innovative drug companies to evergreen their products by adding bells and 
whistles to a pioneering product even after the original patent for that 
pioneering product has expired, the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal 
would reward evergreening even if the generic manufacturer (and thus the 
public) does not thereby derive any benefit from the subsequently listed 
patents.”). 
 95. Guidance Document, supra note 52, at 27 (Confirming a “patent 
specific analysis” relating to the NOC Regulations.). Further, the Canadian 
government stated that only certain patents are eligible for protection under 
the NOC regulations, indicating that not all patents fall within the purview of 
the regulations. Id. at 11; see also Ferring Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 
[2007] F.C. 300, para. 57 (Can.) (confirming the patent-specific analysis). 
 96. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 7 (Delhi H.C.) 
(India) (“Such linkage would undermine the ‘Bolar/Early Working’ of the 
patent and deny space for generic medicines.”). 
 97. Bayer Corp., LPA 443/2009, at para. 32. 
 98. Id. at para 7. 
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such as these, one could conclude that the primary problem 
with pharmaceutical linkage may not be the concept of linkage 
itself (e.g., balancing generic early working and brand patent 
protection), but rather the breadth of the legal nexus between 
drug approval and drug patenting, as well as well as how the 
regulations operate within the larger system of policy levers, 
which are intended to stimulate brand and generic drug 
development. Both issues are dealt with in detail in the 
discussion that follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Therapeutic Product Lifecycle Innovation 
Incentives 
The figure illustrates the complex interrelated legal mechanisms 
comprising the system of innovation incentives for brand and generic 
drug development. The left and right y axes are qualitative 
innovation and public benefit indices. The x axis represents the 
product development lifecycle over time. Black waveforms represent 
the progression of drug development from publicly funded university 
research to commercialization of medical products by firms (large 
peak), followed by subsequent genericization (smaller peak). The slow 
ramp to peak in each case represents the amount of research and 
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development necessary to prepare for and obtain regulatory approval. 
As indicated by the dotted black lines, the degree of innovative 
research involved in going from baseline (a) to brand products (c) is 
much greater than that required for generic drugs (b). The red 
waveform normalizes the generic curve for public benefit owing to 
price competition. Brand and generic drug development are 
incentivized at various points in the lifecycle by numerous policy 
levers, including the broad (research and development) and narrow 
(Bolar) components of the Hatch-Waxman (Title I) safe harbor 
provision, patenting by universities and firms stimulated by Bayh-
Dole and the traditional patent system, patent term extension under 
Hatch-Waxman (Title II), data exclusivity for brand regulatory 
submission packages under TRIPS and other FTAs, and 
pharmaceutical linkage under Title I of Hatch-Waxman. Time gates 
for the various policy levers illustrated at the bottom of the figure are 
not intended to be closed, but rather reflect their general timing in 
the context of the product development lifecycle. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the complex system of legal incentives 
typically employed globally for developing brand and generic 
drugs, using the United States as an example. This system 
encompasses a number of interrelated policy-levers, such as 
traditional patent incentives for firms and universities under 
patent and Bayh-Dole legislation.99 It also includes the broad 
research exemption for preclinical and clinical research for 
originator firms under Title I of Hatch-Waxman, multiple data 
exclusivity periods for regulatory submissions by originator 
firms under TRIPS and FTAs (such as NAFTA), and extended 
patent terms to originator firms to compensate for regulatory 
delays under Title II of Hatch-Waxman. Additionally, provision 
is made for extended patent protection for brand firms under 
the linkage regulation provisions of Title I of Hatch-Waxman 
for products in later stages of development, and the safe harbor 
for generic products under Title I of Hatch-Waxman. As 
indicated by a comparison of the Y-axis data, brand products 
have a greater level of innovation, entail a greater degree of 
research and development, and have a broader scope of safe 
harbor protection than their generic counterparts. The generic 
products nevertheless have a substantial public welfare benefit, 
compared to pioneering products, due to their fractional cost. It 
is worth noting that, notwithstanding the large public welfare 
                                                          
 99. For a discussion on the Bayh-Dole legislation, see Bhaven N. Sampat, 
Patenting and U.S. Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before 
and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772 (2006). 
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benefit ascribed to generic drugs, only one of the seven policy 
levers described in Figure 1 is aimed at facilitating generic 
entry—the Bolar provision.100 
It appears reasonable to assume that legal vehicles, such 
as those depicted in Figure 1, are intended to work together to 
foster innovation while providing as much public value as 
possible by facilitating generic entry.101 Indeed the Committee 
on the Judiciary stated in 1984 that the amendments were 
consistent with the traditional role of Congress to “balance the 
need to stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the 
public interest,” in this case increasing the availability of 
generic substitutes.102 However, while the rationale for linking 
the Bolar exemption to multiple patents listed on the patent 
register may at one time have been aimed at balance (e.g., a 
safe harbor abeyance from infringement during the working-up 
phase to the detriment of patentees, balanced by effective 
intellectual property protection on innovative drugs in favor of 
patentees), empirical data that exists at this point suggests the 
balance effected through this specific legal mechanism may not 
work as envisioned. 
One of the most abundant areas of debate regarding 
pharmaceutical linkage is whether the provision allowing 
multiple patents to be listed on the patent register is the main 
culprit, as opposed to strategic abuse of the automatic stay 
provision, which is usually singled out as the water thrown on 
the fire of timely generic entry.103 Ironically, in Bolar, litigation 
was focused on a single patent (relating to the sleep aid 
flurazepam), rather than a cluster of product, use, route of 
administration, process, and combination therapy patents, that 
in turn can be listed on multiple chemical forms of the same 
original drug.104 The conclusion one can draw from this 
analysis is that the drug approval-drug patent nexus under 
linkage law should be construed narrowly rather than broadly, 
                                                          
 100. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
 101. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984). 
 102. Id. at 26. 
 103. See Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 24 (“[T]hrough misapplication of 
complex regulatory schemes, the FDA process is subject to abuse by parties 
claiming protections to which they are not legally entitled, and which are, 
technically, legally impossible.”); HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra nota 26, at 
3; Avery, supra note 8, at 173; Bulow, supra note 8, at 26. 
 104. See Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) 
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which is consistent with its original purpose in Bolar.105 
Simply because infringement of one or more patents may 
be held in abeyance, while a generic company works-up its 
manufacturing processes prior to regulatory approval, does not 
justify the grant of prolonged market exclusivity for a cache of 
older drugs protected by a large group of patents, many of 
which may be invalid or not infringed by the generic 
equivalent.106 Moreover, the policy goal of holding patent 
infringement in abeyance under the safe harbor provision 
desires that equally strong patents will be associated with the 
regulatory submission of the party requesting abeyance, and 
that competing products will be developed. It is reasonable to 
assume there should be an analogous reciprocity under the 
linkage regime, as generic products are by nature less 
innovative, but have substantial social benefits owing to price 
competition. In light of the foregoing, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that generic products should not be prevented from 
gaining regulatory approval by a cluster of follow-on patents 
that are associated with new and innovative drug products only 
distantly in time; the original goal of Bolar was to minimize the 
regulatory lag for generic firms to work-up regulatory 
submissions and obtain approval.107 This can be contrasted to 
the much more substantial increase in cumulative patent 
protection that can result from listing multiple weak patents 
against one or more marketed drugs. 
The discussion thus far suggests that it is plausible that 
provisions in linkage laws allowing multiple patents to be listed 
against a given drug over time, with little or no requirement for 
                                                          
 105. See id. at 863. 
 106. See FED. TRADE COMM’N 2002, supra note 11, at viii. 
[D]ata in the study suggest that the generic applicants have brought 
appropriate patent challenges: generic applicants prevailed in nearly 
75% of the patent litigation ultimately resolved by a court       
decision. . . . [and] most generic applicants have waited to enter the 
market until at least a district court has held that the patent covering 
the brand-name company’s drug product was invalid or not infringed 
by the ANDA.”); HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 5 (“Since 
1998, generic pharmaceutical manufacturers have won at least 75% of 
the cases under the Regulations. However, even when the generic 
firm wins the court cases, the brand-name drug company has 
successfully extended its market monopoly, sometimes for years after 
the expiry of the basic patents. 
Id. 
 107. See supra notes 
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proportional public welfare benefit, represents the weak link in 
the regulations as they currently operate. This can be argued 
for two reasons. First, patents may be listed on the patent 
register as long as they meet statutory listing requirements 
and are deemed relevant to the marketed drug—relevant being 
a term that has proven very difficult to legally define.108 It 
appears that the relevance requirement can at times be very 
minimal,109 with the effect that often multiple patents are 
                                                          
 108. See generally Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (“The Hatch-Waxman Amendments . . . do not include any explicit 
provisions . . . enabling or prohibiting an action to challenge a patentee’s 
listing of a patent . . . the FDA has provided a limited process for disputing the 
accuracy or relevance of patent information submitted to the FDA . . . .”). The 
Court explained that 
One who questions the accuracy of the patent information may write 
to the FDA, and the FDA will request that the applicant confirm the 
information. . . . [but] ‘[u]nless the application holder withdraws or 
amends its patent information in response to FDA’s request, the 
agency will not change the patent information in the list . . . . 
Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). As noted in earlier work by our group, top appellate courts in 
Canada have wavered substantially on the issue over the last half decade: 
Early Federal Court of Appeal jurisprudence in Eli Lilly v. Canada 
rejected the notion of a strict relevance requirement, opting instead 
for a narrow statutory reading to the effect that patents need only be 
relevant to a medicine rather than the drug form specifically 
approved by regulators. In other words, patents could be listed 
generally for a drug rather than against a specific drug submission. 
In 2006, the government issued a Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statement (RIAS) accompanying amendments to the NOC 
Regulations explaining that listed patents were required to contain at 
least one specific claim to the medical ingredient, formulation, dosage 
form or use for which approval was granted. This was followed by the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in AstraZeneca v. Canada, 
which supported a specific relevance requirement and cast doubt on 
the reasoning employed by lower courts in defending a general listing 
requirement. The Federal Court of Appeal, citing AstraZeneca, 
reversed its earlier ruling that a patent containing a claim for the 
medicine in a drug is listed generally against the drug, rather than 
against the specific submission for a notice of compliance upon which  
the patent list is based. The government issued a revised guidance 
document in 2009 attempting to harmonize previous jurisprudence 
and policy grounds supporting a specific listing requirement. 
Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12, at 180–81. 
 109. See Wyeth Canada v. Ratiopharm Inc., [2008] 1 F.C.R. 447, 462 (Can. 
Ont. C.A.). 
[a] generic drug manufacturer initially may be required to 
address every patent listed in respect of the Canadian reference 
product to which the proposed generic version is compared, 
whether or not the patent is properly listed. If there is an 
allegation of invalidity or noninfringement, the NOA may lead to 
a prohibition application and the commencement of the automatic 
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listed per drug, particularly for high value pharmaceuticals.110 
The rationale typically used for this low listing requirement 
has been that drug regulators are not equipped to assess 
patents on the register. Ironically, In Bayer v. India, the same 
rationale was used to reject linkage.111 
Second, and more importantly, is the fact that multiple 
patents do not exist in isolation; both in scope and time. They 
are interconnected to multiple related drugs through weak 
regulatory submission requirements,112 which in turn allow for 
large numbers of follow-on drugs comprising a temporally 
evolving cluster of related products and patents.113 As a result, 
                                                          
24 month statutory stay. However, the generic drug 
manufacturer may move under paragraph 6(5)(a) of the NOC 
Regulations for an order dismissing the prohibition application 
entirely, or dismissing it in relation to the improperly listed 
patent or patents. 
Id. See also GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 52, at 7–8 (“[A] patent will be 
eligible where it is relevant to the drug which is the subject of the submission 
against which the patent is to be listed. More precisely, the factors for 
determining the eligibility of a patent submitted with a drug submission,” 
including factors such as “medicinal ingredient,” or a “formulation that 
contains the medicinal ingredient . . . dosage form . . . or use of the medicinal 
ingredient.”) (emphasis added); see also AstraZeneca Can., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 
para. 39 (“[T]he NOC Regulations require[] a patent-specific analysis, i.e. the 
generic manufacturer is only required to address the cluster of patents listed 
against submissions relevant to the NOC that gave rise to the comparator 
drug . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 110. EDWARD HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 20–23 
(discussing how brand name drug companies can use different listing 
strategies to continue evergreening their patents). Dr. Marcia Angell stated 
that “[n]othing drug companies do is as profitable as stretching out monopoly 
rights on their blockbusters”). Id. at 21; see also Bouchard et al., Drug 
Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12 (demonstrating empirically that 5% of 
granted patents are listed on the patent register for blockbuster drugs); 
Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom, supra note 12 (demonstrating 
empirically, that while 5% of granted patents are listed on the patent register 
on average, the percentage grows substantially with profit such that over 20 
patents can be listed and litigated on the most profitable drugs); Hemphill & 
Lemley, supra note 13; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 13. 
 111. Bayer Corporation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. LPA 443/2009 
(Dehli H.C.) (India). 
 112. Cf. Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12, at 
188–90 (describing how the broad scope of regulatory approval for new and 
follow-on drugs  supports the extension of patent monopolies on older 
blockbuster drugs). 
 113. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 126: 
Product clusters are hypothesized to be comprised of an ever-
expanding number of follow-on drugs centered on a single new and 
original drug.  Products in the cluster are surrounded by a halo of 
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originator firms appear to have transferred the thrust of their 
competitive activities away from competition between each 
other and towards encouraging competition within their own 
formulary departments.114 The goal of this internal competition 
appears to be to produce as many follow-on drugs as possible in 
order to keep generics off market for as long as possible. This 
has been referred to as portfolio-based innovation, analogous to 
portfolio financing.115 There is no question that portfolio-based 
innovation is a superb form of innovation from an 
organizational perspective. The question is, is it desirable from 
                                                          
patents, all of which are interconnected between products within a 
given cluster.  These patents serve two primary functions.  First, they 
provide support for follow-on drug development within in the cluster, 
and second they provide fodder for listing on the patent register to 
delay generic entry on the original new and innovative drug.  The 
greater the number of patents permitted to be listed on the patent 
register and the greater the scope of patent classifications per patent, 
the greater the ability of patents to support a product cluster and 
thus to delay generic entry….. Clearly different clusters will have 
different spatiotemporal characteristics, for example whether they 
represent clustering within or between brand-name firms or whether 
there is a single or small number of truly new and innovative drugs 
per cluster, but the clustering effect of follow-on drugs and associated 
patents over time remains a central theme. 
See generally BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMECUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE (2000) 
(noting the linkage between the pharmaceutical industry and patent 
legislation in Europe and how European patent law allows the exclusion of 
competition for products on a fixed time scale); Bengt Domeij, Initial and 
Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177–98 (Ove Granstrand, ed., 2003) (examining 
court decisions in Europe and identifying ways in which courts can create 
extra incentives for valuable follow-on inventions). 
 114. For a defense of the innovative nature of follow-on drugs, see Joseph 
A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug Research and 
Development Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development 22 
PHARMACOECONOMICS (SUPPLEMENT 2) 1 (2004); Joseph Di Masi and Laura 
Faden, Competitiveness In Follow-On Drug R&D: A Race Or Imitation? 10 
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 23 (2011). For a rebuttal to DiMasi, see: Aidan 
Hollis, Comment on The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and 
Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development, 23  
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1187 (2005). 
 115. E.g., William Kingston, Intellectual Property’s Problems: How Far is 
the U.S. Constitution to Blame?, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 315, 327 (2002) (noting 
that changes to the U.S. Patent Act in 1952 have created a situation that 
conduces to the development of a portfolio of patents which allow 
pharmaceutical companies to spread the risk of research and development 
across a wide portfolio of related projects under common control). Similarly, 
Polk and Parchomovsky observed that the right to exclude conferred by a 
collection of related patents under common control is greater than the sum of 
individual patents. R. Polk Wagner & Gideon Parchomovsky, Patent 
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
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a social welfare perspective? 
In the era pre-dating pharmaceutical linkage, brand 
pharmaceutical firms typically developed discrete drugs that 
were associated with one or a small number of patents; once 
that small number of patents expired, products could be 
copied.116 In this scheme, pharmaceutical firms were in a 
similar position to firms in other industries, including those in 
other technology-heavy sectors.117 An argument can be made 
that this process in turn provided an incentive for competition 
between brand firms, consistent with judicial articulations of 
the ends and means underpinning the traditional patent 
bargain.118 
A different situation has evolved in the post-linkage era, 
where loopholes in linkage laws appear to favor a drug 
development strategy that privileges “product clusters.”119 
                                                          
 116. For a review of the relationship of these changes to the multiple 
patent listing model under linkage, see Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading 
Whom?, supra note 12; Bouchard, Still Your Baby, supra note 5. For a review 
of “technology-specific” patent law, see Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley. Is Patent 
Law Technology Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1157–1208 (2002). 
 117. For a review of major changes in United States and global patent law 
since 1952 and the impact of these changes on patent portfolios and drug 
development, see Kingston Id and Stuart Macdonald, When Means Become 
Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent Strategy on Innovation, 16 Info. Econ. 
& Pol’y 135 (2004). 
 118. For analysis of balancing patent law and competition law in U.S. 
appellate jurisprudence, see, for example, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 
U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (noting that in many modern fields, market demand 
drives design trends); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) 
(remarking that the rapid advance of technology requires patent holders to be 
aware of these conditions within the context of judicial standards); Hotchkiss 
v. Greenwood 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850); Royal Typewriter Co. v. 
Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948) (describing the balance 
between disclosure of the invention for gain to the inventor and the potential 
for others to take advantage of the discovery without benefit to the original 
inventor). For a parallel analysis in Canadian jurisprudence, see, e.g., 
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, para. 37 (Can.) 
(describing the bargain between patentee and the public, which requires 
protection of the patent holder in exchange for the disclosure of the invention 
with the agreement of the public to not allow an extension of the patent 
beyond a certain term of years); Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 1024, para. 13 (Can.) (“In return for disclosure of the invention to the 
public, the inventor acquires for a limited time the exclusive right to exploit 
it.”). 
 119. See generally Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra 
note 12, at 176–83 (describing the development of linkage regulations in the 
United States and Canada and product how the interaction of linkage law 
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Product clusters are hypothesized to be comprised of an 
expanding number of follow-on drugs evolving from a single 
new and original drug, surrounded by a constellation of 
patents, which interconnect products within a given cluster 
through a combination of traditional infringement law and the 
listing provision under emerging linkage law.120 These patents 
serve two different yet vital functions. First, they provide 
support for follow-on drug candidates via traditional 
infringement law, and second they provide fodder for listing on 
patent registers to delay generic entry under linkage law. 
Perhaps most important for policy-makers may be the sum of 
the interactions between multiple drugs and multiple patents 
in these clusters that most effectively chills generic entry. 
Given that empirical data are only beginning to be 
reported on pharmaceutical linkage, this clustering effect may 
present a more substantial barrier to generic entry than 
previously recognized and it is not clear whether generics are 
being adequately compensated for taking on the risk of 
litigation.121 Our work thus far suggests this conclusion may 
apply more strongly in jurisdictions where litigation under 
linkage regulations does not constitute final decision, where 
linkage laws do not provide generic entrants with an 
                                                          
with patent law and food and drug law may conduce to the development of 
product clusters). For an articulation of the product cluster hypothesis, see 
generally RON A. BOUCHARD, PATENTLY INNOVATIVE: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL 
FIRMS USE EMERGING PATENT LAW TO EXTEND MONOPOLIES ON 
BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS (BIOHEALTHCARE PUBLISHING SERIES ON PHARMA, 
BIOTECH AND BIOSCIENCE: SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY) (FORTHCOMING 2011) 
(Chapter 7 describes how linkage regulations have impacted the 
pharmaceutical industry in recent years and provides a ‘path of least 
resistance’ to the development of product clusters); Bouchard, I’m Still Your 
Baby, supra note 5; Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra 
note 12. The term “patent clusters” has been used by the E.C. in its 
“Originator-Generic Competition” Fact Sheet accompanying the EC Sector 
Pharmaceutical Sector Preliminary Report, where it was stated that a 
common strategy employed by brand firms to maintain revenue streams from 
blockbuster drugs for as long as possible is the creation of “patent clusters” by 
the filing of numerous patents for the same medicine. As noted in the report, 
evidence obtained by the Commission from inspections of originator companies 
revealed that the objective of the clustering strategy was to delay or block the 
market entry of generic medicines. 
 120. See supra note 119 
 121. Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2010] 2 F.C.R. 389, para. 101–02 (Can.); 
For a discussion of the issue of generic compensation, see generally Aiden 
Hollis, Generic Drug Pricing and Procurement: A Policy for Alberta, SPS RES. 
PAPERS (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.iapr.ca/files/iapr/Hollis%20on%20line%20final%20Feb%203.pdf. 
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exclusivity period for first movers compared to those that do 
not, where the relevance requirement for patent listing is 
comparatively weak, where patents are comparatively easier to 
obtain, where linkage law allows for settlements between brand 
and generic firms to restrain competition in the 180 day first 
mover period, and where the evidentiary standard for the 
approval of new and follow-on drugs is comparatively low. 
Evidence reviewed to this point suggests the Bolar 
provision was narrowly intended to encourage generic entry. 
Evidence that this narrow exception to patent law was 
ultimately in service of a short-term exemption that favors, not 
restricts, competition can be found in the words of the CEC to 
whom the Hatch-Waxman bill was referred: 
The purpose of sections 271(e)(1) and (2) is to establish that 
experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is 
to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid 
patent expires, is not a patent infringement. . . . Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to grant exclusive 
rights to an inventor for a limited time. That limited time should be a 
definite time and, thereafter, immediate competition should be 
encouraged. For that reason, Title I of the bill permits the filing of 
abbreviated new drug applications before a patent expires and 
contemplates that the effective approval date will be the expiration 
date of the valid patent covering the original product. Other sections 
of Title II permit the extension of the term of a patent for a definite 
time provided certain conditions are met.122 
According to this argument, evergreening123 of older 
products via multiple patent listing is contrary to the objective 
of Hatch-Waxman to facilitate generic entry via a short-term 
suspension of patent infringement and competition. 
The Committee on the Judiciary (COJ), to whom Hatch-
Waxman was also referred, acknowledged that FDA rules 
restricting generic entry prior to Hatch-Waxman “had serious 
anti-competitive effects” and that the “net result of these rules 
has been the practical extension of the monopoly position of the 
patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent.”124 The COJ 
went further as regards the multiple patent listing issue, 
stating: 
The first amendment rejected by the Committee was offered by Mr. 
Hughes. The Hughes amendment would have permitted the granting 
                                                          
 122. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 123. See supra note 47. 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984). 
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of a patent term extension for the substances regulated by the bill for 
each regulatory review period. The net result of the amendment was to 
permit multiple patent term extensions on what was essentially the 
same drug product. This amendment was supported by the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO). The PTO argued that the version of 
H.R. 3605 reported by the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
would create two different types of patents for drugs; those which are 
extendable and those which are not extendable. The latter category, 
they claim, includes subsequent use, method and composition patents. 
  The Committee considered these arguments and rejected them for 
two reasons. First, the Committee accepted the rationale put forward 
by the Committee on Energy and Commerce concerning the need to 
avoid multiple patent term extensions. Our sister Committee argued 
that the only patented product which experiences any substantial 
regulatory delay is the first product patent (or if there is no product 
patent, the first process patent). Therefore, they reason that 
subsequent patents on approved drug products are frequently not the 
same magnitude of innovation as occurs with respect to the initial 
patent. Thus, the Committee on Energy and Commerce concluded on 
public policy and health policy grounds that only the first patent on a 
drug-type product should be extended.125 
In making these comments, the COJ stated in plain and 
unambiguous terms that patent extension on weakly 
innovative products was contrary to public policy and health 
policy grounds.126 The specific mention of the “first product 
patent” parallels comments made in the parliamentary debate 
in Canada prior to linkage coming into force that generic entry 
would occur on expiry of the “main patent” on a given 
product,127 not on expiry of a cluster of patents. This statement 
is coherent with that of the CEC to the effect that the 
appropriate time for generic entry is the expiration date of the 
valid patent (or patents) covering the original product and that 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments do not contemplate any other 
method of extending patent term.128 
Later in its report, the COJ was more explicit as to what 
public policy grounds were involved, stating that early generic 
availability would substantially “assist in the reduction of 
health care costs. . . these reductions will be especially 
important to the poor, the under-insured, and the elderly.”129 
The government as a purchaser of prescription drugs was also 
deemed to benefit substantially by the amendments. The COJ 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 50. 
 128. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 129. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984). 
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also stipulated that given the regulatory nature of the industry 
involved, early working allowing a shortening of the delay of 
generic entry between eighteen and twenty-four months would 
not unduly encroach on the patent rights of brand firms and 
thus properly enhanced competition between brand and generic 
firms.130 This is consistent with the statement of the Federal 
Circuit in Mylan, to the effect that the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments were intended to balance two competing policy 
goals and that this balancing function was achieved by 
establishing a generic drug approval procedure at one end of 
the balance and restoring patent terms for pioneer firms to 
make up for lost time during the regulatory approval stage at 
the other end.131 No mention was made of creating a second 
back-end process for evergreening older drugs. 
While it may not have been anticipated at the time linkage 
came into force in either originating jurisdiction, and bearing in 
mind the COJ’s statement that up to Bolar, Congress “has 
never had occasion to evaluate the competing policy 
considerations presented by this bill,”132 the empirical data that 
have been reported in countries with longer standing linkage 
regulations, such as the United States and Canada, suggest 
that the multiple patent listing mechanism has grown to be 
sufficiently unwieldy that the outputs of the system (delayed 
generic entry and anti-competitive effects) maybe in increasing 
conflict with the twin policy goals underpinning both Hatch 
Waxman and the NOC Regulations. That is, that permitting 
multiple patent listings on an array, or cluster, of related drug 
products may yield a system which behaves in precisely the 
same manner said by the COJ to offend public policy and 
health policy grounds.133 
There have been numerous suggestions in case law and 
government reports that the multiple patent listing models was 
adopted because food and drug agencies such as the FDA, 
Health Canada, and others, did not, and indeed do not, have 
the expertise to judge patent validity and/or infringement. This 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 29 (1984) (“As a result . . . generic drugs will be able to be placed 
on the market between 18 months and 2 years earlier than without this 
provision.”). 
 131. Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984)) . 
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29 (1984). 
 133. See supra notes 124–130 and accompanying text. 
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sentiment was echoed in the recent Bayer v. India decision.134 
The court held that drug regulators were “plainly not equipped 
to deal with issues concerning the validity of a patent” and that 
to oblige regulators to do so would be inconsistent with their 
mandate as regulators and the private law function of domestic 
Indian patent legislation.135 Indeed, amendments linkage law 
pertaining to patent listing in jurisdictions such as the United 
States and Canada that have been interpreted by some to be  
successful136 may be less so than recognized in the long run, if 
only because they have been too far downstream to be truly 
effective. In other words, the amendments have been aimed at 
fixing automatic stay abuses even though the antecedent 
problem that gives rise to these downstream abuses is that of 
multiple patent listing, particularly in relation to product 
clusters. As discussed above, this reasoning was employed in 
Bayer to deny linkage of food and drug law to patent law 
through the infringement section of India’s patent 
legislation.137 
A mechanism for oversight of patent listing that may be 
both more efficient and more effective than policing by the 
courts or drug regulators may be to create a separate 
administrative body within the mandate of the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) to independently assess patents for 
relevance to new and innovative drugs prior to listing, as occurs 
in some jurisdictions with regards to drug price controls. 
Similar arm’s length institutions have been created to police 
                                                          
 134. Bayer Corporation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. LPA 443/2009 
(Dehli H.C.) (India), at para 28 
 135. Id. 
 136. See generally Epstein & Kuhlik , supra note 8, at 14 (arguing that the 
gains from biomedical innovation outweigh the barriers presented by the 
“anti-commons” and that Hatch Waxman has been a positive, rather than 
negative, vehicle for development of the generic drug industry in the United  
States). But see Avery, supra note 8, 196–200 (declaring the Medicare 
Modernization Act, which was passed to alleviate the abuses of the Hatch-
Waxman Act by pharmaceutical patent holders, had been unsuccessful in 
achieving that goal); Hemphill and Lemley, supra note 13 (noting that Hatch 
Waxman is not working as intended because pharmaceutical patent owners 
have responded with a “sophisticated program of product “lifecycle 
management,” which is code for finding ways to extend exclusivity as long as 
possible”.). 
 137. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 22 (Delhi H.C.) 
(India) (“In granting marketing approval to a patented drug, the D[rug] 
C[ontroller] G[eneral of] I[ndia] is by no means itself infringing upon any 
patent or abetting the infringement of any patent by the applicant in whose 
favor the marketing approval is being granted.”) (alteration in original). 
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drug prices in Canada (Patented Medicines Prices Review 
Board, or PMPRB)138 and to facilitate translational research 
and innovative drug development in the United States 
(National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences),139 and 
to guide the use of health technologies, clinical practices, and 
health promotion based on considerations of efficacy and cost-
effectiveness in the United Kingdom (National Institute for 
Clinical Excellent, or NICE).140 
An alternative to an independent advisory board would be 
to develop a qualitative innovation index for assessing the 
social value of pharmaceutical products and related patents. 
Where an index of this nature is grounded in regulatory 
preferences for new and follow-on drugs expressed by 
regulators themselves, it could be used to determine which 
patents should be listed on the patent register.141 Such an 
index might, to a significant degree, side-step some of the 
criticism of regulatory agencies for lacking expertise as to 
patent quality.142 This is because the selection at issue would 
be grounded in regulatory preferences expressed by public 
health agencies exercising their mandate to set the evidentiary 
benchmarks relating to benefit versus risk, unmet medical 
need or significant advance in therapeutic value. Decisions of 
this nature, unlike those relative to patent validity, are within 
the expertise and mandates of health agencies such as the 
FDA, Health Canada, and the European Medicines Agency. 
Finally, we note that there may be subtle but significant 
cultural differences between jurisdictions as to the tendency of 
both brand and generic firms to game the system and the 
reaction of the public and government when the system is 
                                                          
 138. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD (last visited April 18, 
2011), http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/home.asp?x=1. 
 139. Gardiner Harris, A New Federal Research Center Will Help to Develop 
Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1. 
 140. NATI’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CLINICAL EXCELLENCE, 
http://www.nice.org.uk/ (last visited June 13, 2011). 
 141. Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property II: A Novel 
Innovation Index for Pharmaceutical Products (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809817. 
 142. See, e.g., Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: 
Patent Submission and Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month 
Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a 
Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 68 Fed. Reg. , 
36,676, 36,683 (June 18, 2003). 
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effectively gamed. Jurisdictions such as the United States that 
are viewed by some to have more of an arm’s length relation 
between government and industry and be comparatively more 
litigious in seeking legal remedies,143 may exhibit faster and 
more efficient adaptive responses than jurisdictions with more 
cooperation between government and industry. As indicated by 
the rapid and strong responses of nations such as India144 and 
Australia145 to the push for linkage in those jurisdictions 
compared to the more receptive responses of nations such as 
Canada, Mexico, and South Korea, it is possible there are 
significant cultural differences in the manner in which linkage 
is accepted or refuted and, when it is accepted, the speed and 
strength of adaptive responses by law-makers when the system 
is acknowledged to list to one side and require correction. A 
similar conclusion may be drawn with regard to the 
comparative responses of the public and governments of the 
United States and Canada in response to perceived abuses of 
the automatic stay provision. 
The goal of further research on original policy intent will 
be to obtain empirical qualitative and quantitative data to 
determine whether or not multiple patents listed per drug 
provide the linchpin for a potential clustering effect of this 
nature. As revealed by the recent E.C. Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry, the Bolar debate is far from over: some originator 
firms are claiming that by permitting marketing authorization 
before a patent dispute has been settled, “the authorities 
willingly collude in the alleged patent infringement”.146 The 
                                                          
 143. Wiktorowicz, supra note 30, at 643 (describing the conflict resolution 
process between industry and the government in the United States as 
involving public hearings and redress through the courts and how this differs 
from the degree of public-private partnership between government and 
industry in Canada, the United Kingdom and France). 
 144. See infra text accompanying notes 173–180 
 145. See infra text accompanying notes 164–165. 
 146. Final Report, supra note 22, at 315. 
Certain originator companies allege that by granting marketing 
authorisation, the authorities willingly collude in the alleged 
infringement. These originator companies therefore argue that no 
marketing authorisation should be granted until the allegation of 
patent infringement has been settled. Occasionally, actions are 
accompanied by a threat to sue the marketing authorisation body for 
damages if marketing authorisation is granted.” 
Id. 
As long as these activities are strictly necessary to prepare for an MA 
application, they are not deemed to infringe patents rights … for 
medicinal products in view of the so-called Bolar provision. This 
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argument is not persuasive, but nonetheless may carry weight 
with some regulators. 
 
B. LEGAL CHECKS AND BALANCES 
In addition to identifying the original policy intent for 
linkage, it is also important to map the system of legal checks 
and balances in different linkage regimes and investigate how 
they operate together to determine the outputs of the system. 
The specific basket of checks and balances in a given linkage 
regime is vital, as it determines not only how a complex system 
of pharmaceutical regulation begins operating de novo 
following the coming into force of law but also how it evolves 
over time to yield demonstrable empirical results. It has been 
shown, for example, that the behavior of dynamic legal 
systems,147 including how systems learn, self-regulate, adapt 
and grow,148 is strongly influenced by positive and negative 
feedback.149 Positive feedback results in growth or 
amplification of a particular process or group of related 
processes whereas negative feedback results in tamping or 
slowing of a particular process or group of processes. Studies of 
complex social, biological, and technological systems have 
shown that the unintended consequences resulting from 
feedback have the potential to force a system away from 
operating at or near the point of efficiency.150 
                                                          
provision, which was introduced by Directive 2004/27, creates a safe 
harbour for certain tests and studies while the reference product is 
still patent-protected so as to enable the generic producer to apply for 
marketing authorisation once the eight-year period of data exclusivity 
granted to the holder of the original MA has elapsed. 
Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 260. 
 147. Cf. JERVIS, supra note 38 (discussing complexity in political and social 
spheres); Harrison, supra note 9, at 473–77 (describing the complex adaptive 
and dynamic nature of world politics). 
 148. Cf. Ruhl 2005, supra note 42, at 34–39 (addressing environmental 
regulation and arguing that adaptive management regulation is the only way 
to successfully address present and future legal, environmental problems). See 
generally J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe 
the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) (utilizing Complexity Theory, a study in the change 
of dynamical systems, to examine how the law unfolds). 
 149. See generally note 43 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., Robert M. May et al., Complex Systems: Ecology for Bankers, 
451 NATURE 893 (2008) (comparing the financial system to complex adaptive 
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In the case of linkage regulations, unchecked feedback 
could yield an array of results that move the system away from 
its intended consequences. For example, even though the 
original policy intent was to balance production of new and 
innovative drugs with timely generic entry, a poorly operating 
system could yield a decline in innovative products despite 
strong patent protection; substantial delays in generic entry 
despite abbreviated procedures for approval; increased 
monopoly pricing despite incentives for innovation; wasteful 
litigation despite abbreviated approval and litigation processes; 
and increased, rather than decreased, public health costs. 
Results such as these could be the consequence of a system 
with insufficient checks and balances that is driven to certain 
outputs much like damage to one wheel forces a car to 
inevitably list to one side. 
An example of feedback with unintended consequences is 
provided for by the automatic stay, which is a fundamental 
feature of pharmaceutical linkage. Studies in both North 
America jurisdictions where linkage originally came into force 
have demonstrated that that the likelihood of further patent 
listing and litigation on high value drugs increases 
substantially when a brand firm experiences success with its 
first stay.151 Given the automatic nature of the injunction, 
generics can be kept off market with comparatively less risk to 
                                                          
ecosystems and noting the need to identify conditions that make dynamic 
systems unstable). For a look at the role of feedback in policy failure, see 
generally JERVIS, supra note 38 (complex political systems); Ron A. Bouchard, 
Reflections on the Value of Systems Models for Regulation of Medical Research 
and Product Development, 17 HEALTH L. REV. 28 (2008) (discussing the 
purposive systems-based policy development process in the health law area); 
Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 2: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Patent 
Law on Canadian and Global Systems-Based Innovation Ecologies, 15 HEALTH 
L. J. 247 (2008) (discussing the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
KSR v. Teleflex on global innovation ecologies through the conceptual 
framework of complex adaptive systems); Bozeman, supra note 38 (efficient 
markets); Bozeman & Sarewitz, supra note 38 (science policy); Harrison, supra 
note 9 (complexity in international politics); Sterman, supra note 38 
(reflections on the development and utility of systems science and discussing 
the claim that as a result of fundamental uncertainty “all models are wrong”). 
 151. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at 13–21 (studying the 
litigation tendencies of brand-name companies taking action against generic 
companies in the first and second instances of alleged infringement); HORE, 
PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 6–9 (noting that Canada’s patent 
regulations tie up generic manufacturers in litigation thus delaying entry of 
generic drugs). 
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brand firms.152 As noted by the Federal Court of Canada, which 
exclusively hears patent matters under the NOC Regulations, 
“by merely commencing the proceeding, the applicant obtains 
what is tantamount to an interlocutory injunction for up to 30 
months without having satisfied any of the criteria a court 
would require before enjoining issuance of an NOC.”153 As 
widely noted, governments in both the United States and 
Canada have had to step in to amend their respective linkage 
regimes in order to curb various abuses of the automatic stay 
provision. 
The delay of generic entry owing to abuses of the automatic 
stay is just one example of unintended consequences of 
legislation that occur as a result of adaptation by firms as they 
gain experience with the system of legal checks and balances 
that comprise a particular linkage regime. Our work has 
identified a number of differences in the system of checks and 
balances employed by different jurisdictions. It also suggests 
that feedback between these mechanisms can strongly 
influence the output of the system on brand and generic drug 
availability and costs. For example, the U.S. Hatch-Waxman 
regime provides generic firms with the opportunity to early-
work an invention without infringing brand patents (Bolar) as 
well as to indirectly rely on the data in the branded company’s 
application to support a generic company’s application for 
approval.154 These benefits are balanced, however, by the 
automatic stay of thirty months in favor of brand firms, which 
can be shortened or lengthened at the discretion of a court.155 A 
                                                          
 152. In the United States, the risk is also minimized for generics, who can 
resolve patent issues without risking damages incurred in marketing the drug 
and then being sued for infringement. This is not the case in Canada, as 
proceedings under linkage laws are summary in nature and can, and often 
are, followed by full infringement proceedings. A recent study of litigation in 
the European Union revealed that even when disputes are few in number, 
they exert a strong chilling effect on generic entry as a result of the mere risk 
of interim injunctions. Final Report, supra note 22, at 200. The data showed 
that over half of proceedings against generics were preceded by prior disputes, 
leading the authors to conclude the chilling effect of even a small number of 
proceedings “illustrates the strength of the link between patent-related 
exchanges and patent litigation.” Id. at 209. 
 153. Bayer AG v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare), [1993] 
51 C.P.R. (3d) 329, para.13 (Can.). 
 154. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (2006). 
 155. Id. 
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court’s early determination of patent invalidity or non-
infringement will necessarily cut the thirty month period short. 
On a secondary level, the thirty month stay preventing generics 
from entering the market is balanced by 180 day period of 
marketing exclusivity for the first entrant156 where generic 
prices could escalate in absence of further generic competition. 
The intent of this 180 day exclusivity period is to provide an 
incentive to challenge patents.157 This series of legal checks and 
balances should in theory minimize strong positive feedback in 
favor of either brand or generic firms, and works towards 
balancing the interests of both parties as well as the competing 
policy goals involved.158 In practice there has been significant 
gaming of the automatic stay which has led to frequent 
settlements between generics and brands, and frequent 
amendment of linkage laws.159 
Unlike the United States, Canada had a significant generic 
industry prior to the linkage regime. Repeal of compulsory 
licensing and the coming into force of the NOC Regulations was 
also intended to balance the competing interests of brand and 
generic drugs and to effect cost savings for consumers.160 As in 
the United States, both a Bolar provision and thirty month stay 
(now reduced to twenty-four months) were provided under the 
linkage regime.161 However, unlike the United States, the 
automatic stay in Canada was not balanced by any exclusivity 
period for generics, and the incentives for generic entry are 
comparatively weak.162 At the same time, generic firms are 
limited in the damages they can collect if they are excluded 
from the market on the basis of brand litigation on an invalid 
patent.163 Moreover, unlike the U.S. regime, proceedings under 
                                                          
 156. Id. 
 157. See generally Mossinghoff, supra note 8, at 188–89 (chronicling the 
legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act including the rationale behind its 
passage). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at ii–xi (recommending fixes 
to alleviate the gaming by the pharmaceutical industry); see also FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 4–6 (2010) (noting findings of the FTC that numerous 
final agreements delayed generic entry). 
 160. See supra note 5. 
 161. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/1993-
133 (Can.). 
 162. See Hollis, supra note 121, at 34. 
 163. See Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2010] 2 F.C.R. 389 (Can.); Apotex Inc. 
v. Merck & Co., [2009] 3 F.C.R. 234 (Can.). 
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the NOC Regulations are summary in nature and do not 
constitute a final decision on issues of validity or infringement. 
Thus, even under circumstances where a generic has obtained a 
finding of invalidity or non-infringement on all relevant listed 
patents, it is still vulnerable to a traditional infringement 
action on the exact same patents. By contrast, the provision for 
generics to challenge patents prior to marketing and to 
eliminate the threat of infringement is a prime mechanism by 
which the U.S. Hatch-Waxman regime is seen to foster generic 
entry. Were it not for the combination of both mechanisms, 
linkage would operate only as a type of advisory option given 
the vulnerability of generic firms to double-jeopardy type 
litigation. Therefore, unlike the U.S. regulations, the specific 
system of legal checks and balances inherent to the Canadian 
linkage system may provide for greater legal uncertainty and, 
unintentionally, favor brand pharmaceutical firms.164 
Australia, by contrast, seems to have learned and adapted 
well from these experiences. Australian trade negotiators, for 
example, included in the domestic linkage regime specific 
provisions against evergreening and a provision for evidence-
based assessment of pharmaceutical innovation despite 
opposition from American negotiators.165 Analogous to the U.S. 
regime, this provision has been balanced by more recent 
changes to domestic formulary law mandating price controls for 
generic drugs under certain circumstances. Similar to 
Australia, India’s patent legislation also contains an express 
provision against evergreening, which has been challenged 
unsuccessfully by brand firms as being non-compliant with 
TRIPS.166 Thus, it can be seen that different legal mechanisms 
(structure) can impact substantially on the outputs of the 
linkage system (function) in different jurisdictions. 
                                                          
 164. See Hollis, supra note 121, at 8–10. 
 165. Thomas Faunce et al., Assessing the Impact of the Australia-United 
States Free Trade Agreement on Australian and global Medicines Policy, 
GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (Oct. 6, 2005), 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/15. India’s patent 
legislation also contains a provision against evergreening, which has been 
challenged unsuccessfully by brand firms as being non-compliant with TRIPS. 
Indian Patents Act, No. 39, Section 3(d) of 1970, INDIA CODE (1970). For a 
description of Indian patent law in the context of pharmaceuticals, see 
generally FEROZ ALI KHADER, THE LAW OF PATENTS—WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS 
ON PHARMACEUTICALS IN INDIA (2007). 
 166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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Jurisdictions that are contemplating bringing in some form of 
linkage in the future would do well to heed the lessons learned 
by jurisdictions with older forms of linkage. 
C. CONVERGENCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
The original policy intent to balance the competing goals of 
stimulating pioneering innovation and facilitating generic 
entry through the same legal nexus necessarily implies a 
certain degree of policy disharmony. The first of these goals is 
aimed primarily at private gain while the other is to benefit the 
public in the form of lower government expenditures and/or 
lower costs to consumers. While in practice both brand and 
generic firms seek to increase market share for their own ends, 
the goal of cost savings renders increased generic availability 
an important public health issue.167 This has not gone 
unnoticed by the Supreme Court of Canada in its assessment of 
the nation’s linkage regime.168 Similar observations have been 
made by the U.S. Supreme Court.169 It is clear in both 
jurisdictions that convergence of public health and economic 
policy has been embraced, however reluctantly, in the form of 
the linkage regime as well as other legislation relating to 
prioritization and commercialization of publicly funded medical 
research.170 For example, in AstraZeneca v. Canada, the 
Supreme Court of Canada recently held that pharmaceutical 
linkage lies “at the intersection of two regulatory systems with 
sometimes conflicting objectives.”171  Whereas food and drug 
law seeking to ensure the safety and efficacy of new 
medications before they can be put on the market, patent law 
provides private inventors with exclusive right to exploit their 
invention for a period equal to the patent term. Regarding the 
convergence of public health and economic, or industrial, law, 
                                                          
 167. See COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA, BUILDING 
ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 189–91 (2002). Senator 
Hatch, at the time the Hatch-Waxman Act came into force, said “[t]he public 
receives the best of both worlds—cheaper drugs today and better drugs 
tomorrow.” Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 8, at 11. 
 168. AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] S.C.R. 
560 (Can.); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 533 (Can.); Merck Frosst Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National 
Health and Welfare), [1998] 2 S.C.R 193 (Can.). 
 169. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676–79 (1990). 
 170. KRIMSKY, supra note 3, at 177–82; see supra Figure 1. 
 171. AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] S.C.R. 
560, at para. 12 (Can). 
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the court noted that until linkage came into force the two 
regulatory systems were largely kept “distinct and separate.”172 
Other jurisdictions, however, have not heeded the siren 
call of convergence. For example, in the recent High Court of 
Delhi Bayer decision, the court rejected linkage specifically on 
the grounds of convergence.173 Justice Muralidhar, speaking for 
the Court, stated that the legislative schemes for patent law 
and drug approval are “distinct and separate” and that the 
attempt to establish a linkage between the two cannot be 
countenanced.174 The court noted that in granting approval for 
generic equivalents, drug regulators neither per se infringe the 
patent rights of brand firms nor abet the infringement of such 
rights by generic firms simply because the drug is patented.175 
In rendering its decision, the court noted that given the 
presumption of validity for patents associated with the drug for 
which marketing approval is sought, linkage would improperly 
oblige drug regulators to enforce the rights of owners under 
patent legislation, which is not the function of the regulator.176 
The court held that such action was in the private law domain, 
and that when a private right is conferred by a statute such as 
under domestic patent legislation, the proper remedy for an 
infringement of that right must be in terms of that statute and 
no other.177 The court noted that the expectation is that the 
                                                          
 172. Id. 
 173. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009 (Delhi H.C.) (India). 
 174. Id. para. 28. Justice Muralidhar stated 
This Court concurs with the learned Single Judge that the scheme of 
both the Patents Act and the DCA are distinct and separate and that 
the attempt by the appellant Bayer to establish a linkage cannot be 
countenanced. . . . What Bayer wants the DCGI to do is to enforce its 
rights as a patent holder in terms of Section 48 of the Patents Act. 
That is plainly not the function of the DCGI. His powers and 
jurisdiction are circumscribed by the DCA and not the Patents Act. It 
is entirely up to the patent holder to seek whatever remedies are 
available to it to enforce and protect its patent from infringement. 
This is in the private law domain. The DCA has nothing to do with it. 
There is merit in the contention that when a private right is conferred 
by a statute, the remedy for an infringement of that right has to be in 
terms of that statute and no other. 
Id. The court further stated “[t]he expectation is that the patent holder will 
institute appropriate proceedings during the “monopoly” period to safeguard 
its rights in terms of Section 48 of the Patents Act. It does not require the 
DCGI’s help in this.” Id. para. 29. 
 175. Id. at para 22, 25. 
 176. Id. at para 28 
 177. Id. 
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patent holder will institute appropriate infringement 
proceedings under patent law when it deems its rights to be 
infringed, and that patentees do not require the help of drug 
regulators to do so.178 For these reasons, pharmaceutical 
linkage was held to contravene the government’s interest in 
public health by rendering patented drugs unaffordable and 
non-accessible.179 Bayer appealed to the Supreme Court of 
India, which dismissed Bayer’s appeal based on its finding that 
the decision of the High Court of Delhi was well-reasoned and 
without error.180 
While one can look at India primarily as a jurisdiction with 
strong generic interests, the same cannot be said of the 
European Union, where many global pharmaceutical firms are 
based. In its 2009 Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry, the E.C. stipulated that under E.U. law regulatory 
approval is not linked to patent status, nor can the same be 
used to “refuse, suspend or revoke marketing authorisation.”181 
Echoing the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Bayer, the 
Commission specified that 
The task of marketing authorisation bodies is to verify whether a 
medicinal product is safe, effective and of good quality. Their main 
function is to ensure that the pharmaceutical products reaching the 
market are not harmful to public health. Other factors, such as the 
patent status of the product, should therefore not be taken into 
account when assessing the risk/benefit balance of a medicine.182 
Of interest, while some jurisdictions have vetted the 
convergence of food and drug law and patent and industrial law 
                                                          
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. para. 30. 
 180. Bayer Corporation v. Union of India, SLP 6540/2010 (Ind.). 
 181. See Final Report, supra note 22, at 315 n.514: 
Article 81 of Regulation (EC) 726/2004 and Article 126 of Directive 
(EC) 2001/83 provide that an authorisation to market a medicinal 
product shall not be refused, suspended or revoked except on the 
grounds set out in the Regulation and the Directive. Considering that 
patent status is not included in the grounds set out in the Regulation 
and the Directive, it cannot be used as an argument to refuse, 
suspend or revoke a marketing authorisation. The Commission may 
launch infringement proceedings against any Member State which 
infringes the Directive. 
Similarly, in South Korea, the drug approval authority does not take into 
account the patent status on the ground that the drug approval authority is 
not competent to do so. Pharmaceutical Affairs Law Enforcement Regulations, 
Health and Welfare Ordinace No. 32, art. 43(7) (Dec. 30, 2010) (S. Kor.). Only 
when a court confirms a patent infringement is the drug approval cancelled ex 
post. See id. 
 182. Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 261. 
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(United States, Canada, Mexico, and Australia) and others 
have rejected it (European Union, India), some jurisdictions 
seem to be trying to juggle both ends of the balance in order to 
gain a measure of linkage without explicit law. For example, as 
noted above pharmaceutical linkage is not the law of the 
European Union. However, in its report, the E.C. noted that 
several jurisdictions had nevertheless attempted to implement 
some form of linkage, including Hungary, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, and Italy.183 
The Mexican Supreme Court recently held that the main 
function of pharmaceutical linkage is explicitly to provide the 
legal grounds for the regulatory authority to reject marketing 
authorizations that are deemed to violate patent rights.184 The 
court held that the purpose of listing patents on the patent 
register is to establish a link between the grant of marketing 
authorization by health the authorities and industrial property 
authorities that are in charge of granting and protecting patent 
rights for the exclusive use of inventions.185 The court went one 
step further, clarifying that under such linkage it is the proper 
job of the regulatory authority to reject marketing 
authorizations which violate the rights derived from relevant 
patents.186 As such, the Mexican Supreme Court has clearly 
embraced the convergence of public health and industrial-
economic policy. 
From the discussion thus far, it can be seen that different 
jurisdictions have grappled with the issue of the convergence 
and/or divergence of health policy and industrial and economic 
policy with significantly differentiated outcomes. More research 
is necessary to parse out in detail the differing policy grounds, 
public policy values, free trade agreement power imbalances, 
and legislative debates preceding linkage in these jurisdictions 
in order to arrive at whatever unified rules may be at play in 
these divergence outcomes, if any. 
                                                          
 183. See Final Report, supra note 22,  at 316 tbl. 24. 
 184. Mexican Supreme Court Decides on Broad Interpretation of Linkage 
Regulations, PATENT DOCS (Mar. 9, 2010, 11:43 PM), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/03/mexican-supreme-court-decides-on-broad-
interpretation-of-linkage-regulations.html. 
 185. See Alejandro Luna, Supreme Court upholds the worth of formulation 
patents, OLIVARES & CIA, 
http://www.olivares.com.mx/Knowledge/Articles/IPLitigationArticles/Supreme
Courtupholdstheworthofformulationpatents (last visited June 13, 2011). 
 186. Id. 
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D. EXPANSION OF LINKAGE BEYOND THE DRUG APPROVAL-DRUG 
PATENTING NEXUS 
There is growing recognition that the system of 
pharmaceutical linkage regulation is aggressively expanding 
not only geographically,187 but also in scope.188 This expansion 
has the potential to significantly impact domestic systems of 
intellectual property, but may also strongly influence the 
movement of drugs intended for humanitarian purposes 
between nations. As such, it is possible that linkage between 
market authorization and drug patenting may be providing an 
important legal template for expansion of linkage into other 
realms involving pharmaceutical products. 
The recent E.C. Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry is a case in point.189 The report represents the first 
clear articulation of policy reasons for opposition to linkage 
from a major economic region.190 It also clearly outlines an 
expansive legal concept of pharmaceutical linkage. The 
Preliminary Report, issued in November 2008, provided a list of 
existing and emerging patent linkages inherent to what the 
Sector Inquiry described as a “tool-box of instruments and 
measures for how to prepare for and react to generic entry.”191 
The tool-box described by the E.C. focuses on the concept of 
pharmaceutical linkage. The range of described linkage 
practices encompassed the linkage of patent status not only to 
market authorization, but also to: contracts, disputes, and 
litigations between originator and generic companies; 
opposition procedures and appeals before patent offices; patent 
settlements and other agreements between originator and 
generic companies; promotional activities, including an 
                                                          
 187. See Correa, supra note 14, at 401 (explaining that U.S. Free Trade 
Agreements require a linkage between drug market authorization and 
patents). 
 188. See Final Report, supra note 22, at 131. 
 189. Id. at 480 (“The Commission will continue to strictly enforce the 
applicable Community law and, for instance, act against patent linkage, as 
according to Community legislation, marketing authorisation bodies cannot 
take the patent status of the originator medicine into account when deciding 
on marketing authorisations of generic medicines.”). In the Preliminary 
Report, the E.C. stated more specifically that Patent-linkage is considered 
unlawful under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Directive (EC) No 2001/83. 
Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 15. For further elaboration, see 
discussion supra note 35. 
 190. See Final Report, supra note 22. 
 191. Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 22. 
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emphasis on follow-on and other second generation products; as 
well as a range of interventions by brand firms before national 
authorities pertaining to marketing authorization, drug 
pricing, and reimbursement.192 
An evolving landscape such as this raises the question of 
whether the pharmaceutical industry is using linkage as an 
expansive legal and public policy tool to reach across national 
borders. Further research is necessary to elucidate the grounds 
and potential impact of this claim, both nationally and globally. 
E. RIGHTS LAYERING V. SINGLE POINT MECHANISM FOR 
INCENTING INNOVATION 
Emerging empirical data on incremental innovation and 
linkage regulations,193 particularly when taken in combination 
with historical studies of patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals,194 have demonstrated a growing 
sophistication in the ability of pharmaceutical firms to layer 
patent and other intellectual property rights on pharmaceutical 
products at numerous stages of drug development. When 
combined with conventional patent law and the evidentiary 
requirements for new and follow-on drug approval, linkage 
regimes appear to provide a powerful tool for multinational 
pharmaceutical firms to efficiently and effectively identify 
attractive new and follow-on drug candidates for prolonged 
market exclusivity at various stages of the product lifecycle. 
The linkage regime in particular has proven to be a 
valuable tool for firms to obtain enhanced legal protection on 
drugs at all stages of development, including drugs about to 
                                                          
 192. See discussion supra note 36. 
 193. See BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMECUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE (2000) 
(noting the linkage between the pharmaceutical industry and patent 
legislation in Europe and how European patent law allows the exclusion of 
competition for products on a fixed time scale); Bengt Domeij, Initial and 
Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177–98 (Ove Granstrand, ed., 2003) (examining 
court decisions in Europe and identifying ways in which courts can create 
extra incentives for valuable follow-on inventions); Bouchard & Sawicka, 
supra note 110, at 57–58; see generally Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, 
supra note 12, at 1509–21 (discussing the impact of linkage and other 
regulations on drug creation); Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, 
supra note 12, at 189–216; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 13; Hemphill & 
Sampat, supra note 13. 
 194. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3; BOLDRIN & LEVINE, 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3. 
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come off patent protection, drugs moving through the 
regulatory approval stage, and drugs that are currently in 
development.195 The number and array of patent types, the 
speed of patent listing, the automatic injunction, and the low 
relevance requirement for listing combined with low 
evidentiary requirements for new and follow-on drug approval 
enable pharmaceutical firms to rapidly identify attractive drug 
targets for legal protection both during and after regulatory 
approval. Added to patent linkage is the data exclusivity 
regime which, depending on the country being considered, now 
provides for up to 11.5 years of market exclusivity for products 
based on the confidentiality of regulatory submission data.196 
When gauged against reports indicting declining levels of 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry,197 be it from a loss 
of low hanging fruit,198 increasing research and development 
costs,199 or firms aiming ex ante at legal targets offering high 
reward for low risk drug development,200 the question arises of 
whether numerous layers of intellectual property protection, 
and the corresponding extension of market exclusivity, are 
                                                          
 195. Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12 at 181–
82. 
 196. Alexander Stack, Canada: Trade-Driven Changes Coming to 
Canadian Patent and Data Protection Laws? Canada-European Union Trade 
Negotiations, MONDAQ (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/article.asp?articleid=106048. 
 197. See, e.g., BRIAN GUTHRIE & TREFOR MUNN-VENN, CONFERENCE BD. 
OF CANADA, SIX QUICK HITS FOR CANADIAN COMMERCIALIZATION 1 (Apr. 
2005), available at, 
http://www.angelinvestor.ca/userfiles/file/IPTC/Supporting%20Docs%20for%20
IPTC/IPTC%20Conf%20Brd%206%20Quick%20Hits.pdf; Reinventing 
Innovation and Commercialization Policy in Ontario 44 (Inst. for 
Competitiveness & Prosperity, Working Paper No. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.competeprosper.ca/images/uploads/wp06.pdf. 
For a discussion of the decline in innovation in the broader sciences, see 
generally EXPERT PANEL, supra note 58; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, 
INNOVATE AMERICA 22–25 (2005), available at 
http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/NII_Innovate_Ame
rica.pdf; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, FIVE FOR THE FUTURE 18 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/Five_Final_8858C
OC.pdf. 
 198. Fredric J. Cohen, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 78, 82 (2005), available at 
http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v4/n1/pdf/nrd1610.pdf. 
 199. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 158 (2003). 
 200. See Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12, at 1509–13. 
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encouraging or stifling innovation in the pharmaceutical 
sector.201 
It may be that one, not both, mechanisms for protecting 
innovative drugs will prevail in the long run. For example, in 
its review of patent term extension under Hatch-Waxman, the 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office noted that shortening of drug 
review times may be a more effective means of stimulating 
innovative research rather than further lengthening patent 
protection since millions of dollars in sales are lost for each 
extra day a drug stays in the approval process.202 
Given that regulatory review times have declined 
substantially over the last two decades globally in the context 
of user fees,203 one could ask what is the public interest in 
expanding patent terms via the linkage regime either alone or 
concomitant with data exclusivity and patent term restoration? 
Is it in the public interest to continue to link drug approval 
with patent protection to produce multiple layers of exclusivity 
protection? Does the convergence mechanism hold up if the 
economic goals of linkage are not being met? 
These questions are vital from a public health perspective, 
as the growing data exclusivity regime is a nearly perfect 
substitute for patent linkage. How a given nation addresses 
each will impact generic entry and thus cost savings and access 
to essential medications. 
F. ROLE OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS 
Finally, there is the thorny issue of the relevance of 
empirical research on pharmaceutical patents for the making of 
law and policy ex ante as well as its ex post review. At this point 
in time, we are witnessing an influx of highly qualified 
personnel into the field of law with previous experience in the 
hard empirical sciences, particularly the medical sciences. 
Unlike schools of medicine, management, and business at the 
                                                          
 201. See generally Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra 
note 12, at 181–82 (discussing the impact patents and linkage regulations 
have on the activities of pharmaceutical companies in terms of their tendency 
to produce new versus follow-on drugs). 
 202. Glasgow, supra note 25, at 256–57. 
 203. For relevant information regarding review times, see generally Joel 
Lexchin, Commentary, Drug Withdrawals from the Canadian Market for 
Safety Reasons, 1963-2004, 172 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 765, 772 (2005), available 
at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/reprint/172/6/765. 
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end of the first decade of the twenty-second century, schools of 
law, legal systems, and the judiciary are just beginning to 
realize the full potential of empirical legal research to 
contribute to law-making and law reform in areas of law that 
are heavily contingent on science. 
Indeed, there is a growing discordance between the policy 
grounds underpinning the pharmaceutical linkage and the 
results of empirical studies intended to assess their 
effectiveness, as well as that of the patent system more 
generally in providing incentives for innovation. As noted 
above, the goal of the linkage regime is often cited as balancing 
the conflicting policy goals of facilitating the development of 
new and innovative drugs and timely generic entry. Yet a 
number of studies have been published recently that report 
largely negative results on the impact of linkage regulations on 
the approval of new drugs, the timeliness of generic entry, and 
the extension of market exclusivity on blockbuster products 
coming off patent due solely to linkage.204 
The results of empirical studies such as these have 
profound ramifications for assessing how well the linkage 
regime works as currently constituted and thus enables 
conclusions as to the vires of legislation when gauged against 
its original policy goals. It has been demonstrated, for example, 
that loopholes in linkage laws, as they operate in tandem with 
low evidentiary requirements for drug approval, can provide for 
clustering of follow-on drugs and related patents, and that 
these clusters of drugs and patents can substantially extend 
the cumulative patent life of older blockbuster drugs by as 
much as a factor of two.205 
Even when considering only the extension of market 
exclusivity—when all relevant patents listed on the patent 
register have been litigated and found to be invalid or not 
infringed—linkage still delays generic entry by three to five 
years.206 This can be compared to the seven month (weighted 
average) delay for generic entry following the loss of patent 
protection in the European Union in the absence of linkage.207 
The E.C. Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry recently found that 
                                                          
 204. For a review of these studies, see Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra 
note 5, at 77–94. 
 205. Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12, at 1497–94. 
 206. See id. at 1505–06 
 207. Final Report, supra note 22, at 8. 
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over the period studied, savings from generic entry of 
medications would have been twenty percent greater if entry 
had taken place immediately following the loss of brand 
exclusivity.208 Thus, the lag between the loss of brand 
exclusivity and generic entry, and the contribution thereto by 
linkage laws, is critical for public health savings from a 
qualitative as well as quantitative perspective. 
In addition to obtaining data pertaining to drug approval, 
litigation and innovation, it is necessary to investigate the 
relationship of this data to those for sales and profit data before 
and after linkage regulations came into force, the fractional 
cost of generics at different points in the product lifecycle 
compared to brand products across jurisdictions, as well as how 
linkage regulations in different jurisdictions determine the 
duration of market exclusivities and their impact on the price 
of brand and generic drugs, particularly before and after 
litigation under various linkage provisions has terminated. The 
growing cache of empirical data on pharmaceutical linkage may 
be of increasing importance as numerous jurisdictions 
worldwide are in the process of revising, rejecting or enacting 
pharmaceutical linkage regulations. Empirical evidence as to 
the successes and failures of different forms of linkage would 
therefore be valuable, both domestically and globally. 
Discordance between claims for pharmaceutical linkage 
and the so-called “real world” effects of linkage on drug 
development are not new. For example, in the political debate 
leading up to repeal of compulsory licensing and the coming 
into force of the Canadian regulations, an evidence-based 
approach to drug patenting and pharmaceutical linkage was 
explicitly rejected by Parliament.209 During the hearings, a 
U.S.-based economist specializing in drug development gave 
evidence as to the importance of empirical studies when 
assessing linkage regulations, suggesting that a Hatch-
Waxman-like linkage regime would enhance market exclusivity 
for blockbuster drugs several-fold more than anticipated to the 
detriment of payers in the absence of demonstrable increases in 
national research and development capacity.210 The evidence 
demonstrated that multiple patents per drug would be affected 
                                                          
 208. Id. at 9. 
 209. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 102 n.53. 
 210. Id. at 104–05. 
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and that the average delay for generic entry would be on the 
order of ten to fifteen years.211 The data were discounted in 
favor of the unsupported claim that only one patent per drug 
would be affected, the average delay in generic entry would be 
minimal, and the tacit assumption that increased patent 
protection would yield both increased innovation and public 
welfare.212 There appeared to be no middle ground during the 
negotiations or a reasonable appreciation for the value of 
empirical data to the debate.213 A similar situation evolved in 
the United States following the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, 
which was addressed in subsequent amendments to the 
legislation.214 
Data from our early work on global pharmaceutical linkage 
indicate that the debate over the value of empirical data for 
law-making relative to linkage regulations is far from over and 
indeed may be taking on new relevance. Jurisdictions that were 
not ready to address what may have been seen as an isolated 
study during the original debates over linkage 215 are now faced 
with mounting empirical work on pharmaceuticals and 
                                                          
 211. Id. at 105; Tancer, supra note 9, at 294. 
 212. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 104. 
 213. See id. at 102 n.53. 
 214. Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 8, at 14 n.29; Avery, supra note 8, at 
184–87. It was recognized as early as 2001 that pharmaceutical patent 
reforms such as linkage regulations could extend the average patent life of 
pharmaceuticals by at least fifty percent. Glasgow, supra note 25, at 233. In 
its 2002 report, the FTC reported that approximately twenty-eight percent 
and thirty-five percent of patents were either invalid or uninfringed, 
respectively, suggesting that undue prolongation of patent monopolies under 
Hatch-Waxman Act constituted abuses of linkage law. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 11, at 20. Four years later, the U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office noted that the number of new pharmaceutical products was declining. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2006), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf. This decrease 
came even as patent protection for pharmaceuticals had escalated. Jaffe, 
supra note 3, at 531. Results such as these prompted Kesselheim & Avorn to 
note in 2006 that legal exclusivity periods in the pharmaceutical sector had 
already produced a wide range of negative effects on public health, including 
making essential medications unaffordable to developing nations, preventing 
dissemination of patented processes for vitamin fortification to underserved 
populations, limiting the ability of nations to manage epidemics, releasing new 
drugs only as combination therapies to avoid generic entry, and the inflation 
of drug prices. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Biomedical Patents 
and the Public’s Health: Is There a Role for Eminent Domain?, 295 JAMA 434, 
434 (2006). 
 215. For a review of interpretation of Dr. Schondenmeyer’s data in the 
Canadian context, see Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 104–05. 
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patents,216 including linkage.217 A second conclusion is that 
jurisdictions outside North America appear to have taken 
lessons from those with previous experience more seriously in 
bringing in or rejecting domestic versions of linkage. An 
important issue to explore in future research on topic is what 
factors were seen by various jurisdictions as more or less 
important in their policy deliberations and what the likely 
reasons were for others to ignore these lessons. Moreover, 
learning what lessons were drawn from studies of the outputs 
from different systems of checks and balances in various 
jurisdictions, and how did these lessons inform the 
customization of pharmaceutical linkage in various 
jurisdictions will be important to understand. 
Consider, for example, the comparative linkage experience 
in the European Union, Australia and South Korea. Studies 
conducted by Australian and European Union governments, 
demonstrated significant learning from experience and strong 
adaptation. Data obtained by the European Union was broad in 
scope, depth, and balance of analysis, and thus well informed 
linkage policy and law.218 Similarly, after intense deliberation 
and public debate,219 Australia introduced both express anti-
evergreening provisions (involving damages and penalties) as 
well as a provision for pharmaceutical innovation to be defined 
based on considerations of “objectively demonstrated 
therapeutic significance” in its linkage regime, notwithstanding 
significant resistance from U.S. trade negotiators.220 It remains 
to be seen whether this customized system of checks and 
balances will yield an empirically observable balance between 
the production of new and innovative drugs and timely generic 
entry. 
                                                          
 216. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 88–91; BOLDRIN & LEVINE, 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at 212–38; see also ADAM B. JAFFE & 
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT 
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 11–12 (2004). 
 217. A number of papers are dedicated to reviewing the various studies on 
linkage. See generally Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12; 
Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12; Sawicka & 
Bouchard, supra note 12; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 13. 
 218. See generally Final Report, supra note 22; Preliminary Report, supra 
note 22. 
 219. See generally Faunce et al., supra note 165. 
 220. Id. at 2; Faunce & Lexchin, supra note 4, at 5. 
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A similar comparison can be drawn from the differing 
experiences of the United States, India, Australia, South 
Korea, and Canada concerning allegations of evergreening 
abuses. Compared to its American counterpart, the government 
of Canada has been slow to respond to evergreening allegations 
and has minimized the negative effects of linkage on patent 
protection for blockbuster drugs in numerous internal studies 
released between 2004 and 2010.221 By comparison, the 
Supreme Court of India recently upheld the High Court of 
Delhi’s rejection of pharmaceutical linkage, and the nation 
clearly sees itself as a leader on the issues of global 
pharmaceutical law and access to essential medication.222 
Evergreening abuses have been addressed in a unique way in 
this nation using traditional patent law: India’s ‘patent law 
allows for filing of oppositions before the grant of a patent (pre-
grant opposition) which allows competitors (mostly generics) to 
challenge the validity of a patent application before its grant.223 
Indian companies have used pre-grant opposition to effectively 
challenge some of the most profitable drugs, including Glivec, 
Iressa, Tamiflu, and others.224 
Why is Canada lagging behind the United States in its law 
reform efforts? Why is South Korea going forward even though 
its own data are projecting negative domestic impacts? Why 
have some jurisdictions such as Australia and India responded 
quickly and effectively to public interest concerns in bringing 
in, amending, and/or rejecting their domestic linkage regimes 
and what lessons are there for other jurisdictions? 
One possible obstacle to effective policy-making and/or law 
                                                          
 221. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 222. See Delhi High Court Rejects Bayer’s Appeal for Patent Linkage, EUR. 
AIDS TREATMENT GROUP (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.eatg.org/eatg/Global-HIV-
News/Access-to-treatment/Delhi-High-Court-rejects-Bayer-s-appeal-for-
patent-linkage. 
 223. FEROZ ALI KHADER, THE TOUCHSTONE EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF PRE-
GRANT OPPOSITION ON PATENTS 39–40 (2008). 
 224. AstraZeneca’s Iressa Patent Application Rejected in India, INDIAN 
PATENT OPPOSITIONS (Nov. 20, 2007, 11:05 PM), 
http://indianpatentoppositions.blogspot.com/2007/11/astrazenecas-iressa-
patent-application.html; Varun R. Chhonkar, Indian Patent Office Rule 
Against Gilead in Tamiflu PreGrant Opposition, PATENTCIRCLE (April 15, 
2009), http://patentcircle.blogspot.com/2009/04/indian-patent-office-ruled-
against.html; Joe C. Matthew, India Rejects Patent to Glivec’s Second Variant, 
REDIFF INDIA ABROAD (April 15, 2009), 
http://www.rediff.com/money/2009/apr/15india-rejects-patent-to-glivec-
variant.htm. 
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reform is that linkage regulations are complex and not widely 
understood. This is consistent with the observation in Bayer v. 
India to the effect that there is no uniformity in the linkage 
policy of different countries.225 Hence, there is great value in 
comparative legal analysis of different linkage systems 
worldwide. 
A related and important issue is the manner in which 
courts in different jurisdictions view the role of empirical data 
in the context of an evolving legal landscape, particularly with 
respect to technology-heavy areas of the law such as 
intellectual property.226 A pertinent question that arises is how 
should courts and law-makers react when empirical evidence 
demonstrates that a particular piece of legislation is not 
achieving its stated goals? Can such data support the 
conclusion that the legislation is invalid or in need of 
substantial amendment in order for it to remain intra vires? 
Are there aspects of statutory interpretation in various 
jurisdictions that illuminate an investigation into whether the 
local linkage laws are meeting the stated goals of stimulating 
the development of new and innovative drugs and facilitating 
timely entry of generic drugs and if not what should be done 
about it? An ancillary question is whether appellate courts in 
different jurisdictions view law as “live” or “fixed”—and thus 
more or less amenable to ex post empirical analysis. 
There is some work to suggest that it may be useful to 
investigate the vires of pharmaceutical linkage from a 
purposive perspective, using ordinary language of linkage 
statutes informed contextually by the scheme, purpose and 
evidence of statutory intent.227 This approach supports an 
important role for external context, referring to the interface 
between original policy intent and the consequences of how 
legislation works operationally in the real world.228 Taking an 
                                                          
 225. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 32 (Delhi H.C.) 
(India). 
 226. Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1579. 
 227. Purposive analysis of statutory text looks to the “material goals the 
legislature hoped to achieve [and] the reasons underlying each feature of the 
implementing scheme.” RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 204 (4th ed. 2004). Using evidence in 
interpretation “can be helpful in understanding the meaning of legislative 
language . . . [and] expos[ing] and dispel[ling] misconceptions that distort 
interpretation.” Id. at 469. 
 228. See Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 33. 
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“evidence-based” approach to the assessment of vires in a 
technology-intensive sector such as pharmaceuticals resonates 
particularly well with the state of global drug regulation, which 
has clearly and strongly evolved toward “real world” or 
evidence-based lifecycle models of drug approval for the last 
two decades.229 
If drug approval and drug patenting are becoming 
increasingly evidence-based, there is no reason why the legal 
linkage between the two should not do so as well. An evidence-
based approach to vires is supported by the objective of 
identifying the mischief a given piece of legislation was 
intended to remedy at the time it was enacted.230 In the case of 
linkage statutes or regulations, this exercise would likely be 
contingent both on an understanding of the original policy 
intent underpinning local linkage regimes as well as their 
enabling statutes, typically patent legislation.231 When courts 
are presented with competing interpretations of law (e.g., 
public health or economic; patent law or food and drug law), is 
the clear choice one that accords substantively with a 
legislative purpose that is consistent with an interpretation of 
the statute as a workable whole?232 As noted by Fuller: 
The troublesome cases are in reality resolved not in advance by the 
legislator, but at the point of application . . . . All this adds up to the 
conclusion that an important part of the statute in question is not 
made by the legislator, but grows and develops as an implication of 
complex practices and attitudes which may themselves be in a state of 
development or change.233 
In this view, the purpose of law is not static but rather a 
                                                          
 229. Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Balancing Early Market Access to New 
Drugs with the Need for Benefit/Risk Data: A Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE 
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 823–24 (2008). For a discussion of the relevance 
of lifecycle models to pharmaceutical linkage, see generally Sawicka & 
Bouchard, supra note 12, at 109–15. 
 230. Hutchinson, supra note46, at 7 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE Jr. ET 
AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226–27 (2nd ed. 2006)). 
 231. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 107–09. 
 232. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968) [hereinafter Fuller 
1968]; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor 
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 667 (1957) [hereinafter Fuller 1957]. 
 233. Fuller 1968, supra note 232, at 59. As noted by Hutchinson: 
The process of interpreting statute is not just drawing out what 
legislators put into it, but adjusting the statute to the implicit 
demands and values of the society to which it is to be applied. In this 
sense it may be said that no enacted law ever comes from its 
legislator wholly and fully made. 
Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 24 n.129 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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dynamic process of refining and clarifying means and ends 
through a system of positive and negative feedback loops.234 
The purposive analysis thus privileges evidence of how a law 
operates in the lives of people affected by it, not theoretically or 
hypothetically as an isolated idea or goal. In an analytical 
framework of this nature, objective evidence of the operation of 
statutes and regulations such as empirical evidence of 
contextual operational efficiency is paramount.235 
The notion that law is “alive” rather than stagnant draws 
strong parallels to legal scholarship demonstrating law to be a 
dynamic complex adaptive system.236 In such systems, law-in-
operation is strongly contingent on evidence relating to positive 
and negative feedback loops that impact on system 
performance, including empirical data relating to systems of 
intellectual property law and biomedical innovation. 
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Compared to the traditional patent system, pharmaceutical 
linkage regulations represent a novel and evolving intellectual 
property paradigm for pharmaceutical products. Even so, this 
regime is rapidly evolving in a global context, and is poised to 
become an important determinant of the availability and cost of 
essential medications worldwide. In this Article, the authors, 
representing a global network of scholars and practicing 
lawyers, lay out a novel framework for a comparative legal 
analysis of global pharmaceutical regulations. 
A major goal we have identified is to investigate the 
structural and functional aspects of global linkage regulations 
as they relate to drug availability, costs, and expenditures on 
the one hand and incentives for innovation and protection of 
rights on the other. Structure-function analyses in the life 
sciences have lead to numerous key insights into molecular, 
cellular, tissue, organ, and whole body functioning over the last 
half-century. In all of these areas of study, a key observation 
has been that structure not only influences function, but 
function also influences structure through an array of positive 
                                                          
 234. See Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 24. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See, e.g., J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of 
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 101, 109–29 (1997). 
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and negative feedback loops. 
This body of work in the medical sciences applies 
fundamentally to law in two ways. First, because governments 
have specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting law 
and regulations, and these goals are expressed in the form of 
discrete legal and regulatory language. And second, because 
the policy goals and statutory language referred to above are 
reviewable by courts in judicial review and other proceedings. 
In addition these goals and statutes may, and often are, 
revisited by governments in the context of their law reform 
efforts. 
Here, we show that the structure-function paradigm can 
also be a valuable tool for the study of law, particularly the 
comparative analysis of the effects of different legislative and 
regulatory tools on the pharmaceutical innovation ecology. In 
particular, we demonstrate that differences in the discrete 
statutory mechanisms underpinning pharmaceutical linkage in 
different jurisdictions, and the way these mechanisms interact 
with relevant provisions of patent and food and drug law, have 
the potential to substantially alter outcomes and outputs in 
relation to the balance of encouraging the development of new 
and innovative drugs and facilitating timely generic entry. 
A unique advantage of the structure-function methodology 
proposed in this Article is that studying linkage in different 
jurisdictions in this manner allows for both an investigation of 
the structural and functional characteristics of local linkage 
regimes with different initial starting conditions and different 
legal mechanisms of operation and the identification of general 
rules of linkage as the different national forms of linkage 
interact and influence global pharmaceutical regulation. The 
former provides a descriptive mechanism for assessing the 
successes and failures of different regimes while the latter 
provides a prescriptive approach for key decision makers to 
revise, institute or abolish linkage regulations according to the 
goals and objectives of differing nations. 
The specific structural and functional aspects we discuss 
here include, inter alia: assessment in each jurisdiction of the 
original policy intent underpinning linkage; the specific legal 
grounds underpinning linkage in various jurisdictions, in 
particular the Bolar provision and how this provision interacts 
with other policy levers intended to stimulate innovation while 
also making generic drugs available faster; the manner in 
which public health policy and economic policy is perceived by 
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governments and the courts to converge or diverge through 
linkage; the specific legal checks and balances designed 
specifically to maintain balance between the interests of brand 
and generic firms; the growing expansion of linkage beyond the 
drug approval-drug patenting nexus to encompass drug pricing 
and reimbursement; and the role of empirical studies to 
establish the legal legitimacy of linkage regulations. 
The goal of the work outlined here is to explicate the 
different outputs and outcomes of pharmaceutical linkage in 
different jurisdictions, and relate this understanding to among 
other things fundamental differences in statutory language and 
original policy intent in different jurisdictions. A further goal is 
to assist key decision-makers in domestic and global 
governments and legal systems working with linkage regimes 
in their efforts to stimulate the production of new and 
innovative drugs while at the same time facilitating timely 
generic entry, lowering public health costs, and increasing 
access to essential medicines. 
 
 
 
 
 
